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ABSTRACT
We seek to understand the relationship between the 
evolving society and the evolving ideology of the kibbutz 
movement, In the middle stands the kibbutznik who, through 
a process of ideological reformulation, attempts to maintain 
a sense of consistency between the ideology and the real 
kibbutz world, while at the same time attempting to. maintain 
the internal consistency and integrity of the ideology itself.
On the one hand, the kibbutz is committed to moder­
nity in its technological and economic organization and, on 
the other hand, to primitivity in its social relations. The 
problem facing the kibbutz is simply that it has embraced 
two fundamentally contradictory value positions--progress 
and communality--and yet its survival and integrity depend 
to a great extent on how successfully it maintains the com­
mitment to each.
The whole process of ideological elaboration, or 
reformulation, is an attempt to render compatible these di­
vergent trends. Under the economic conditions of progress, 
however, the kibbutz cannot maintain the commitment to com- 
munality in precisely the same way it did in the early days 
of settlement.
IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN THE KIBBUTZ
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the ideological development of 
the kibbutz.movement. There are three major hypotheses 
concerning this development.
First, ideology impacts upon itself and upon social 
structure and, in turn, is impacted upon by social structure.
Second, in the course of ideological development, 
the original values have been continuously reinterpreted so 
as to preserve the integrity of the kibbutzim as a unique 
and highly successful socialist movement which has remained 
true to its ideals. This whole process may be called 
ideological elaboration.
Third, the individual kibbutzim have always been 
dedicated to economic progress--progress both of the movement 
itself and of the Jewish people as a nation--and therein lies 
the crisis in the kibbutz and, specifically, the problem 
facing ideological elaboration.
CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In attempting to understand the relationship between 
kibbutz Ideology and kibbutz society the ideas of Karl Marx, 
Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, and Maurice Cornforth were impor­
tant frames of reference.
Karl Marx Vs analysis of the existential determination 
of ideas dates back to early criticism of his teacher, Georg 
Hegel. Marx observed that "it has not occurred to any of 
these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German 
philosophy with German reality, into the relation of their 
criticism to their own material surroundings" (1930:6).
Marx maintained that ideas were historical and transitory 
products and were no more eternal than the relations which 
they expressed.
With this response to Hegel, Marx focused upon the 
role of social position, particularly class position, in the 
formulation of ideas. To Marx, Ideas were the intellectual 
manifestation of underlying economic interests, reflected 
through the prism of social class. It was from these inter­
ests that ideas gained their source and meaning. We must 
go astray, he suggested, if we
4.
. * detach the ideas of the ruling class from the 
ruling class itself and attribute to them an inde­
pendent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying 
that in a particular age these or those ideas v/ere 
dominant, without paying attention to the conditions 
of production and the producers of these ideas, and 
if we ignore the individuals and the world conditions 
which are the source of these ideas (1964:79-80).
Marx stated further that the manner in which individ­
uals relate to the means of economic production, and to each 
other in the process, constitutes the real foundation, or 
the infrastructure, upon which the cultural superstructure 
of society is built.
In the social production which men carry on 
they enter into definite relations that are indis­
pensable and independent of their will; these rela­
tions of production correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material powers of produc­
tion. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society--the 
real foundation, on which legal and political super­
structures arise and to which definite forms of 
social consciousness correspond. The mode of pro­
duction of material life determines the general 
character of the social, political, and spiritual 
processes of life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their being but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their conscious­
ness (Marx; 1964:51)*
Simply put, "determinate individuals* who are productively 
active in a definite way, enter into...determinate social 
and political relations" (Marx; 1964:74).
It is interesting to note that in his earlier 
writings Marx was insistent on the priority of economic 
factors; however, later writings represent a substantial 
compromise on this point."*"
5The political, legal, philosophical, 
literary, and artistic development rests on the eco­
nomic. But they all react upon one another and upon 
the economic base. It is not the case that the eco­
nomic situation is the sole active cause, and that 
everything else is merely a passive effect. There 
is, rather, a reciprocity within a field of economic 
necessity which in the last instance always asserts 
itself (Marx; l'962s 30*0*
Marx went on to say that
...the ultimately determinant element in history is 
the production and reproduction of real life. Hence 
if somebody twists this into saying that the economic 
element is the only determining one, he transforms 
that proposition into a meaningless, abstract and 
senseless phrase. The economic situation is the 
basis, but the various elements of the superstruc­
ture... also exercise their influence upon the course 
of the historical struggle and in many cases prepon­
derate in determining their form (1962:488).
In the Marxian formulation, bourgeois ideology was 
conceived to be a distorted, falsified and therefore invalid 
defense of their privileged social and economic position.
1. "Similarly, Marx has been proved wrong on almost 
every single count on which he made a prediction specific 
enough to be tested: the revolution did not occur in highly 
industrialized, but rather in industrially "backward," 
countries; it did not bring about the classless society, nor 
did it eliminate internal conflicts and contradictions; and 
the middle class did not diminish in a process of polariza­
tion, but instead increased steadily; and so on. On the 
other hand, the proposition that the "final" causes of social 
change lie in the economic sphere is untestable. Since no 
empirical specification for the concept "final" has been 
provided, any impetus originating in the economic sphere can 
be viewed as a final cause, whereas any impetus originating 
in another sphere may be viewed as nonfinal. Moreover, 
when he predicted the fading away of the state in a class­
less society, Marx, like Spencer, did not specify the con­
ditions or time at which he expected this to come about. 
Consequently, this thesis, too, is untestable" (Etzioni; 
1964:8).
6.
Marx’s own ideas, on the other hand* were held to be unbiased 
and factual statements of a class, the proletariat, with no 
privileged social or economic position to defend.
It is at this point, and with this fundamental 
assumption, that Marxist theory comes under criticism for a 
failure to satisfy certain intellectual requirements inherent 
in ideological development (Cornforth: 1972), and becomes of 
questionable heuristic value. These intellectual require­
ments are equally applicable to Marxist and kibbutz ideology.
Failing to recognize that in ideology there 
takes place a process of the reflection of the real 
world in men's ideas, (the Marxists) regard ideology 
exclusively as a development of various ideas expres­
sing and serving various material, economic inter­
ests. This leads them to one or other of two 
conclusions. On the one hand, they conclude that 
since all ideas are merely practical instruments 
serving various material interests, no ideas, inclu­
ding their own, can lay claim correctly to reflect 
reality--so that every ideology, including their own, 
is as illusory as every other in all respects. On 
the other hand, they are led to make an exception 
of themselves as special people who, by some intel­
lectual miracle, have transcended every class point 
of view and can look down on the rest of mankind 
from an ivory tower of complete and absolute 
"objectivity." In either case they are clearly in­
volved in self-contradiction (Comforth; 1972:73)*
While Marx's conception of society was one of con­
flicting social classes within changing social structures 
and economic relations. Max Weber was concerned with the 
subjective meanings that individuals impute to concrete social 
relationships in a particular socio-historical context.
First, Weber postulated four basic types of socially relevant 
action: (1) purposive or goal-oriented rational action; (2)
7 *
value-oriented rational action5 (3) action predicated on 
emotion or affection; and (^ ) traditional action. Second, 
he used the typology as a tool to understand historical 
change. In doing this he conceived of historical change as 
a shift from traditional to rational action, and he used 
the greatest historical change of the century--the Industrial 
Revolution--as an excellent case In point.
In his monumental work, The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, Weber theorized that certain religious 
ideas were at work in Western Europe, that were not present 
in India, China, Babylonia, and Egypt, which provided a 
positive ethical sanction for discarding old ideas concern­
ing economic behavior and thus paved the way for the emer­
gence of modern capitalism.
The pioneers of the modem economic order 
were, he argues, parvenus, who elbowed their way to 
success in the teeth of the established aristocracy 
of land and commerce. The tonic that braced them 
for the conflict was a new conception of religion, 
which taught them to regard the pursuit of wealth 
as, not merely an advantage, but a duty. This con­
ception welded into a disciplined force the still 
feeble bourgeoisie, heightened its energies, and 
cast a halo of sanctification round its convenient 
vices. What is significant, in short, is not the 
strength of the motive of economic self-interest, 
which is the commonplace of all ages and demands no 
explanation. It is the change of moral standards 
which converted a natural frailty into an ornament 
of the spirit, and canonised as the economic virtues 
habits which in earlier ages had been denounced as 
vices. The force which produced it was the creed 
associated with the name of Calvin. Capitalism was 
the social counterpart of Calvinist t h e o l o g y . ^
2. From R. TawneyTs foreward to Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital!b m, trans. by 
T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 2.
8 *
The central idea Weber used in confirming his theory 
is expressed in the characteristic phrase "a calling."
To the Calvinist, Weber argues, the calling 
is not a condition in which the individual is born, 
but a strenuous and exacting enterprise to be 
chosen by himself, and to be pursued with a sense 
of religious responsibility. Baptized in the 
bracing, if icy, waters of Calvinist theology, the 
life of business, once regarded as. perilous to the 
soul... acquires a new sanctity. Labour is not 
merely an economic means*, it is a spiritual end. 
Covetousness, if a danger to the soul, is a less 
formidable menace than sloth. So far from poverty 
being meritorious, it is a duty to choose the more 
profitable occupation. So far from there being an 
inevitable conflict between money-making and piety, 
they are natural allies, for the virtues incumbent 
on the elect-diligence, thrift, sobriety, prudence- 
are the most reliable passport to commercial pros­
perity. Thus the pursuit of riches, which one had 
been feared as the enemy of religion, was now wel­
comed as its ally,, The habits and institutions in 
which that philosophy found expression survived 
long after the creed which was their parent had 
expired, or had withdrawn from Europe to more con­
genial climes. If capitalism begins as the prac­
tical idealism of the aspiring bourgeoisie, it ends, 
Weber suggests in his concluding pages, as an orgy 
of materialism.3
Weber*s emphasis on the function of religious ideas
in the emergence of modern capitalism was the cornerstone
. . . . . 4of his critique of Marx's theory of economic determinism.
3. Ibid., pp. 2-3-
4. In emphasizing the role of religious ideas in 
the emergence of the capitalist system, Weber is not with­
out criticism himselfc "Why insist that causation can work 
in only one direction? Is it not a little artificial to 
suggest that capitalist enterprise had to wait, as Weber 
appears to imply, till religious changes had produced a 
capitalist spirit? Would it not be equally plausible, and 
equally one-sided, to argue that the religious changes were 
themselves merely the result of economic movements?
Brentano's criticism, that the political thought of 
the Renaissance was as powerful a solvent of conventional
9 •
He maintained that Marx had myopically emphasized the causal 
connection leading from the economic infrastructure to the 
cultural superstructure, and that this simplified explana­
tion did not adequately take into account the complex cause' 
and effect relationships of the economy to cultural products 
and human behavior. Weber suggested instead that economic, 
technological, political, religious, and ideological factors 
should all be viewed as potentially independent variables 
which impact upon each other as well as on the course of 
society.
Perhaps no other name is more closely associated 
with the sociology of knowledge than that of Karl Mannheim. 
It is not surprising therefore that his analyses are par­
ticularly important in understanding the relationship 
between kibbutz ideology and kibbutz society.
Kibbutz ideology, or any ideological system, may be 
viewed as an attempt "made by people to understand and give
restraints as the teaching of Calvin, is not without weight. 
In England, at any rate, the speculations of business men 
and economists as to money, prices, and the foreign exchan­
ges, which were occasioned by the recurrent financial 
crises of the sixteenth century and by the change in the 
price level, were equally effective in undermining the at­
titude which Weber called traditionalism. Recent studies 
of the development of economic thought suggest that the 
change of opinion on economic ethics ascribed to Calvinism 
was by no means confined to it, but was part of a general 
intellectual movement, which v/as reflected in the outlook 
of Catholic, as well as of Protestant, writers. Nor was 
the influence of Calvinist teaching itself so uniform in 
character, or so undeviating in tendency, as might be infer­
red by the reader of Weber's essay. On the contrary, it 
varied widely from period to period and country to country, 
with differences of economic conditions, social tradition, 
and political environment" (Ibid., pp. 8-9)*
10.
an account of the real world in which they live, or of some 
aspect of it and of their own lives, so that it may be of 
service to them in the definite conditions in which they 
live" (Cornforthj 1972:70).
Mannheim, on the other hand, distinguished between 
two levels of ideology, the particular and the total. The 
particular conception refers to the possibility that a 
given statement may be tendentious, and considers the psy­
chological motivation of the individual. The total concep­
tion refers to "the ideology of an age or of a concrete 
historico-social group, e.g., of a class...(and is) con­
cerned with the characteristics and composition of the 
total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group" 
(1936*56). The distinction here is whether an isolated 
idea or an entire mind may be viewed as ideological. Within 
the total conception of ideology a further distinction is 
made, between special and general ideology, in which "the 
decisive, question is whether the thought of all groups 
(including our own) or only that of our adversaries is re­
cognized as socially determined" (1936:77)*
In fact, Mannheim held that, strictly speaking, it 
was incorrect to say that the single individual thinks.-^
5 . Mannheim suggested that "opinions, statements, 
propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their 
face value but are interpreted in light of the life- 
situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies fur­
ther that the specific character and life-situation of the 
subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interpre­
tations" (1936:55)*
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Rather it is more correct to insist that he parti­
cipates in thinking further what other men have 
thought before him. He finds himself in an inher­
ited situation and attempts to elaborate further 
the inherited modes of response or to substitute 
others for them in order to deal more adequately 
with the new challenges which have arisen out of 
the shifts and changes in his situation (1936*3) •
To Mannheim, it was clear that men do not confront 
the world "from the abstract levels of a contemplating 
mind as such, nor do they do so exclusively as solitary 
beings. Oh the contrary, they act with and against one 
another in organized groups, and while doing so they think 
with and against each other" (1936*3)*
In analyzing the existential determinants of know­
ledge and ideas, Mannheim assigned great importance to 
social class and generational differences. Both variables 
locate individuals In the social and historical process, 
and thereby "limit them to a specific range of potential 
experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic 
mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type 
of historically relevant action" (1952:291)* To Mannheim,
6. As a point of comparison, Thorstein Yeblen empha­
sized the ways in which thought and knowledge are linked to 
particular lifestyles and the organization of the community. 
"The scheme of thought or of knowledge," he wrote, "is in 
good part a reverberation of the schemes of life" (1919*105)* 
Veblen suggested that ways of thinking are determined by 
social and occupational position in particular, and are re­
flected in knowledge and behavior. "The scheme of life 
which men perforce adopt under the exigencies of an indus­
trial situation shapes their habit of thought on the side 
of their behavior.... Each individual is but a single com­
plex of habits of thought, and the same psychical mechanism 
that expresses itself in one direction as conduct expresses 
itself in another direction as knowledge" (1919*105)*
12.
all knowledge and ideas are "bound to a location, " arid con­
sequently all thought is situatlonally relative, inevitably 
perspectivistic. As he defined it, perspective "is some­
thing more than a merely formal determination of thinking. 
(It) signifies the manner in which one views an object, 
what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his 
thinking" (1936s2k k ).
Underlying and reflecting these existential consid­
erations is something called the Ideological mentality. 
Attempts to qualify this concept are at the heart of this 
analysis of the kibbutz, and necessarily focus on the manner 
in which kibbutz ideology has been developed, elaborated 
upon, and justified. One way in which the ideological men­
tality may be manifested is in what Mannheim called the 
utopian state of mind, which is "incongruous with the state 
of reality within which it occurs (and) when (it passes) 
over into conduct, (tends) to shatter...the order of things 
prevailing at the time" (1936:192). Out of this arises a 
false consciousness, or an incorrect interpretation of one's 
own self and one's role, in which
...persons try to cover up their "real" relations 
to themselves and to the world, and falsify to 
themselves the elementary facts of human existence 
by deifying, romanticizing, or idealing them, in 
short, by resorting to the device of escape from 
themselves and the world, and thereby conjuring up 
false interpretations of experience. We have a case 
of ideological distortion, therefore, when we try 
to resolve conflicts and anxieties by having re­
course to absolutes, according to which it is no 
longer possible to live. This is the case when we 
create ’’myths, " worship "greatness in itself," 
avow allegiance to "ideals," while in our actual
conduct we are following other interests which we 
try to mask by simulating an unconscious righteous­
ness, which is too easily transparent (1936*96).
Cornforth called this state of mind "ideological 
illusion" and located the source in the production relations 
of society. However, he suggested that these illusions are 
not "created by (individuals) consciously reflecting on 
their own social relations and working out for themselves,
In a scientific manner, an accurate and systematic account 
of the social structure which they find in existence" 
(1972:82).
As any Ideological system develops, that is, as it 
is elaborated, the tension-management properties of the 
system come into clearer focus along with the realization 
that ideological illusion may be a natural by-product of 
the development. It is important to note that while ideo­
logical systems may be characterized in terms of tension- 
management, this simply identifies the objective of the 
process of ideological elaboration and does not mean the 
system is necessarily successful in reducing tensions.
Cornforth suggested that the intellectual require­
ments facing ideological systems are simple, yet very dif­
ficult to satisfy.
Ideologies must be made to satisfy, in the 
first place, the general requirements of the re­
flection of reality in ideas, that is to say, the 
laws of logic. In the second place, they must 
satisfy the particular requirements of the reflec­
tion of a particular part of reality, that is to 
say, they must be made to square with the facts so 
far as people have experienced and ascertained them.
l^ f ft
Ideologies, therefore, are developed on the 
basis of the given structure of society to serve 
the interests of one or another class, and in this 
ideological development the effort is always being 
made to render the views developed self-consistent 
and logical, and to make them cover and give some 
consistent account of the principal facts which 
emerge in the experience of society at the given 
stage of development.
This gives rise to continual contradictions 
in the development of ideologies. For on the one 
hand, the views developed by the representatives 
of various classes prove logically Inconsistent and 
inconsistent with plain facts t and on the other 
hand, facts and the requirements of logic lead to 
conclusions which do not accord with views tena­
ciously held. Such contradictions give rise to a 
continual process of the elaboration of ideologies, 
as the ideologists endeavour to find ways and means 
of resolving them....
Ideologies are always peculiarly vulnerable 
and open to criticism on the score of self-contra­
diction and of failure to reckon with experienced 
facts. Those who, as intellectual representatives 
of a given class, espouse a general point of view 
in ideology, are always being driven for this reason 
to elaborate their ideology, which leads them to the 
creation of often very complicated and far-fetched 
ideological structures.... If this process of cri­
ticism goes on in the development of ideology of a 
particular class, it takes a different and sharper 
form when, on the basis of new factors in the 
material life of society, new and rival views begin 
to be formed, expressing the interests of different 
classes. Such views do.not emerge until the devel­
opment of material life gives birth to them. But 
once they emerge, they attack from the new point of 
view the manifold inconsistencies of the already 
established views. They make use of logic and ap­
peal to facts as powerful intellectual weapons with 
which to discredit and demolish the old views 
(1972:70-72).
According to Mannheim, ideologically determined 
action always falls short of its intended meaning, a condi­
tion manifested in the ideological mentality, of which there
are three fundamental types:
15.
As the first type...we may regard the case in which 
the conceiving and thinking subject is prevented 
from becoming aware of the incongruence of his 
ideas with reality by the whole body of axioms in­
volved in his historically and socially determined 
thought. As a second type of ideological mentality 
we may present the "cant" mentality, which is char­
acterized by the fact that historically it has the 
possibility of uncovering the incongruence between 
its ideas and its conduct, but instead conceals 
these insights in response to certain vital-emotional 
interests. As a final type there is the ideological 
mentality based on conscious deception, where ide­
ology is to be interpreted as a purposeful lie. In 
this case we are not dealing with self-delusion but 
rather with purposeful deception of another 
(1936:195).
In attempting to understand the relationship between 
kibbutz ideology and kibbutz society the debt to Marx, Weber, 
Mannheim, and Cornforth is apparent? to Marx for his theory 
of economic determinism; to Weber for his analysis of the 
role of Ideas in historical change; to Mannheim for his 
analysis of the existential determination of ideas; and, to 
Cornforth for his conception of the process of ideological 
elaboration as presenting certain intellectual requirements 
and having built-in tensions. While these analyses cer­
tainly do not constitute the whole of the contributions to 
the sociology of knowledge, together they do indicate that 
the linkages between ideas, social structure, cultural 
products, and human action are complex indeed. In short, 
they are an important frame of reference in which to con­
sider the case of the kibbutz.
CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGINS OF THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT
Kibbutzim are collective settlements, the largest 
of which has about 1,500 members and about 70 of which have 
fewer than one hundred. The average size is roughly 350 
members. In 1971 there were 236 kibbutzim, the majority 
located in border areas, with a combined population of al­
most 100,000. This represents about three per cent of the 
total Israeli population.
The kibbutz movement is a construct of four funda­
mental principles: voluntarism, communality, equality, and 
the pioneering spirit. To fully understand the ideological 
development of the kibbutz, one must begin with the reali­
zation that the movement is the confluence of three his­
torical trends or forces, namely, Zionism, socialism, and 
the youth movements of Eastern Europe shortly before the 
turn of the century.
Historically, the kibbutz movement is one of the 
expressions of modern Zionism. Jews have always been "a 
pariah people, an extra-territorial people, dispersed among 
many areas and populations, having common religious identity 
rooted in a normative past and pointed toward a messianic
1?.
future" (Sturm? 1971*101). Always on the periphery-of total
social acceptance, the shtetl (ghetto) Jew was excluded from
many jobs, and thus tended toward self-employment, i.e.., as
a shopkeeper, moneylender, or merchant. The entire Jewish
community at the turn of the century very nearly represented
7
a petty bourgeois caste, surrounded and restricted by the 
Gentile society (Diamond: 1957)6 The connotation of the 
Jew as a "mercenary man" made him somewhat less of a man in 
the physical, masculine sense? in fact, it could be said 
that the Jew was "a caricature of a natural and normal man, 
both physically and spiritually" (Spiro; 1970:^7)-
The intense feeling of personal parasitism, 
a feeling that was raised to the level of ideology 
and said to describe Jews everywhere, cannot be 
explained solely on the basis of a reaction to ob­
jective social conditions. It goes beyond the con­
ception of the Jewish bourgeoisie as a socially 
parasitic body, damned, once for its Jewishness, and 
again for its bourgeoisie status, and singles out 
the individual Jew as a parasite in the deepest 
recesses of his nature. It is, in short, a feeling 
ad hominen. It was a feeling that the vattikim had 
about themselves as Jews, as people fleeing from 
work and productive labor (Diamond; 1957*78).
Indeed, "those pioneers who did not come from the technically 
delimited shtetl areas were reacting against parallel or 
convergent elements in their own milieux, against what can 
be called a more diffused version of shtetl culture"
7. "We use the expression "petty bourgeois" tech­
nically because most of the manual laborers were self- 
employed or worked In small, family-owned shops. Further, 
neither the peak nor the base of the Jewish pyramid extended 
significantly beyond the petty bourgeois range in the Gen­
tile pyramid" (Diamond; 1957*76).
18.
(Diamond; 1957*740.
In the. kibbutzim the shtetl generated Its own anti­
thesis , in which a quasi-religious significance was attached 
to the soil and to the intrinsic value of productive self­
labor as Instruments in the personal and national regener­
ation of the Jewish people. Both of these aspects of the 
pioneering principle were perhaps best expressed by Aaron D, 
Gordon, a worker at the first kibbutz and an important 
spokesman for the kibbutz movement In the early days. In 
1911» he wrote:
In Palestine we must do with our hands all the 
things that make up the sum total of life. We must 
ourselves do all the work, from the least strenuous, 
cleanest, and most sophisticated, to the dirtiest 
and most difficult. In our own way, we must feel 
what a worker feels and think what a worker thinks. 
From now on our principal ideal must be'Labor....
The ideal of Labor must become the pivot of all our 
aspirations.... What we need is zealots of Labor.^
However, Zionism was not the only causal factor in 
the ideals and conduct of the early kibbutzniks. The second 
most dominant influence was socialism. Most Jewish immi­
grants to Palestine at about the turn of the century were 
from Eastern Europe, particularly Russia. "In that context, 
the socialist movement represented the same effort to over­
come exploitation, alienation, and dependency as the Zionist 
movement" (Sturm; 1971:1040. Sturm went on to point out 
the convergent elements in Zionism and socialism:
8. From Sturm; 1971*106.
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The difference between Zionism and socialism, as 
expressed by one kibbutznik, is that while Zionism 
is the effort of the person as Jew to attain liber­
ation, socialism is the effort of the person as man 
to attain the same end* Thus the socialist princi­
ple is the more universalistic counterpart of the 
Zionist principle* But neither principle is indi­
vidualistic. Liberation within these categories 
of thought does not mean each man going his own 
way. Quite the contrary, liberation means cooper­
ation, a working together for the mutual benefit 
of all (1971-: 10.40.
Another causal factor in the development of the 
kibbutz movement was the creation of countless Jewish youth 
movements in Europe at about the turn of the century* 
Rejected by the Gentile society, these youths, in turn, 
rejected the traditional Jewish identity. For them every 
aspect of shtetl life, the physical and psychological nar­
rowness of the ghetto, the traditional Jewish culture and
the personality type it created, and the so-called Jewish
9physical type, was repugnant.
Not even in the midst of his family life did 
the Jewish youths find consolation and stimulation. 
The split between fathers and sons widened. The 
sons stood, as it were, at the crossroads. They 
had escaped from the world of yesterday, in which 
their fathers were still immersed, but the world 
of the future was still enveloped in fog (Spiro*,
1970 s 42).
"We were always opposed to the life of our parents," 
was the comment of one settler. "We always," said another, 
"stressed the necessity for rebellion against parents and 
the parental way of life" (Spiro? 1970:42). As Becker put
9. In Kibbutz Kiryat Yeddim, members would still 
point with pride to Jews who were "so nice-looking you would 
never know that they were Jewish" (Spiro; 1970:41).
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it, they "loathed and hated the world of their elders, and 
were ready to follow any Pied Piper whose mystery and power 
held promise of a new realm where longings found fruition" 
(19^6:73).
"Many ideals, both social and national, appeared on 
the market and offered themselves to the young, bewildered 
Jew" (Baratz; 1949*30)* First, the appearance of political 
Zionism with the dreams of a Jewish National Homeland; then 
the ideals of the Russian socialist movement; and, finally, 
the preservation of the diaspora, associated with the cre­
ation of the Socialist-Jewish League®
The revolutionary idealism of the young Jews was 
manifested in membership in the various youth movements 
throughout Europe at that time, which incorporated both 
socialist and Zionist philosophies® Through these youth 
movements many young Jews sought to escape Jewish tradi­
tionalism, retreating to nature and searching for adventure. 
With the main emphasis of the movement cn scouting and 
camping, the escape from "Jewishness" was as much physical 
as psychological.
Trudging along with the beloved leader, 
came the new way of life: wandering at will through 
the fields and forests, and hills, pitching camp in 
a ruined castle or under the lindens fringing a 
little cluster of peasant homes where the shames of 
the city were absent (Becker; 1946’:. 75)*
So deep-seated and profound were these early exper­
iences that one kibbutz leader, thirty years later, stated 
that "communal living came from the hikes in The Movement"
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(Spiro; 1970:^8).
The youths also rejected the bourgeois materialism 
of their parents in favor of asceticism and simplicity. 
They saw
...in the luxurious life of the privileged few in 
the societies in which they were reared a decadent 
form of existence. The Utopia they envisioned 
would not be one of artifical embellishments of 
nature but of the fundamental, natural expressions 
of mankind. This assumed'-two-’forms s one of an al­
most religious character of asceticism and depri­
vation, the other an emphasis upon the simple and 
natural gratifications in life (Golomb and Katz; 
1970:^2).
"Equality, in the form of a reaction against the 
gross social inequalities of European society, became a 
(kibbutz) value in itself without qualification" (Maron; 
1971 *.18).
The traditional family, (the youths) felt, 
was characterized by the subjection of the wife to 
her husband and the subservience of the child to 
the father. Moreover, they charged the division of 
labor that characterized the family and which, in 
turn, was a reflection of the broader social system, 
confined the woman to the home, relegated her to 
the role of housewife, and precluded her participa­
tion in the economic, cultural, and political life 
of the community (Spiro; 1955:283).
Howard Becker outlined two important functions of 
the group in the lives of the youth movement members. First, 
"the sense of belonging to a band of dissenters, to a con­
venticle of the elect, had a peculiar thrill for you," said 
one kibbutznik. Another kibbutznik remembered that the 
group "gave substance to our lives, for we felt that we were
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different from others, better than they, for we were going 
to start a new life" (19^6:77)0
The crucial significance of this feeling of 
being "different" and "better" than others because 
of a determination to build a "new life," cannot be 
underestimated. It is this feeling, together with 
its social and psychological consequences, which 
served--and continues to serve--to transform a 
nebulous and romantic scouting movement into a 
self-conscious political- community (Becker; 19^6:47)*
The other function served by the group was to pro­
vide its members with precisely those emotional experiences 
which would give them the sense of joy, freedom, and com- 
munality they sought. "Their cherished selves," commented 
Becker, "would expand and deepen in and through the surging 
emotions called forth by banding together with the like- 
minded and undergoing the experiences of the "expedition" 
and the "nest" (19^6;77).
The emigration of these radical youths to Palestine 
began shortly after the turn of the century, for others the 
exodus came as the pogroms increased after World War I. 
Post-war anti-semitism was merely one item in a long Jewish 
indictment of Western culture and of the "bourgeois ideology 
of the French Revolution" (Spiro; 1970:^9). Thus, when 
these young Jews found that the Western Enlightenment, with 
its liberalism and emancipation, was not intended for Jews, 
many emigrated to Palestine. The insistence on aliya, or 
immigration, claimed a perceptive kibbutznik,
...was the real solution for us, since it was the 
final outlet, the culmination of the youth movement.
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Instead of collapsing like other youth movements, 
(some) succeeded because (they) offered a final 
realization or culmination in Palestine. If it 
weren’t for Zionism, (the movement) would have be­
come just another episode In the life of those who 
did not want to continue the life of their fathers 
(Spiro; 1970:51)o
The intensity of the historic mission attached to 
the establishment of the Jewish State was strengthened by 
’’the sense of shame of Jewish existence, so widespread among 
the Jewish youth of Eastern Europe. They were impressed by 
Russian socialism, and this shame found its need for action 
in Zionism" (Infield; 19^*18-19). The synergy of these 
three elements explains in large part how and why the kib­
butz movement came to be. However, a fourth factor wrought 
considerable influence on the course of kibbutz development, 
namely, the pragmatic considerations facing the immigrant- 
pioneers.
SETTLING THE DESERT
In 190h-191^ approximately 35»000 Jewish Immigrants 
came to Palestine, among them 10,000 young socialists from 
Eastern Europe who wanted to do manual work. However,
Jewish agricultural settlements had been trying to establish 
themselves in Palestine since 1882, with little success.
The young Jews began immigrating at a time when the trial- 
and-error procedure of finding the most efficient means of 
organizing Jewish agriculture was ready for a full-blown 
collective experiment. "After the bitter experiences of the 
early, privately-owned individualistic settlements, the
pioneers turned to collective living, believing that the 
collective unit built on mutual aid would succeed where 
individual enterprise had failed" (Darin-Drabkin; 1963?59)« 
At that time, at least, it meant "either settlement In 
groups or no settlement at all" (Infield; 19^*1^).
From the beginning, Jews were attempting to create 
a "grass roots" society, that Is, a society rooted in agri­
culture, without which the hope of a Jewish National Home­
land could not materialize (Crown? 1965)* Only by working 
the land could the Jewish people ever hope to possess it. 
This required manual labor to which Jews of the First Aliya 
(in the 1880s) were unaccustomed. Instead of becoming 
workers, they exploited the large supply of cheap Arab labor 
to establish themselves as landlords. A. Bein, the histor­
ian of Zionist settlement in Palestine, stated that "if 
this development had gone on unchecked, Jewish settlement 
in Palestine would have been in danger. A small class of 
Jewish owners would have controlled a big number of Arab 
workers--and for how l o n g ? " I n  addition, these estates 
were losing money and had to depend on subsidies from the 
Jewish philanthropist, Baron de Rothschild. At the begin­
ning of the century, there were only a thousand Jewish 
farming families (many of whom were existing on such subsi­
dies from relatives and friends), the existing faims were 
not very successful, and "the formation of a solid farming 
community seemed as distant a goal as ever" (Darin-Drabkin;
10. From Darin-Drabkin; 1963:63*
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1963:62). "A viable Jewish national community could never 
have come into being under such conditions" (Sanders ; 1965«50)<
The Jews of the Second Aliya, which began after the 
Kishinev pogroms of 1903> set about, first, to establish 
self-sufficient agricultural settlements in Palestine and, 
second, to establish a Jewish laboring class. Of the 10,000 
young socialists who came to Palestine in 190*1— 191^, only 
about 1,000 of them found the manual work they sought.
Thus, 90 per cent of them became discouraged and left for 
the cities, or left the country altogether. The Jews that 
remained had to live collectively to keep the costs of living 
low enough to compete with Arab labor (Sanders: 1965).
Also, "the method of communal living helped them emotionally 
and physically to bridge their way into a new and difficult 
life" (Sanders; 1965:50)* Soon the Arabs began to under­
stand the political motives of the new Settlers. It was no 
longer the settlement of individual farmers; Jewish settle­
ment was becoming a national movement (Baratz: 19^9)* Under 
these circumstances, collective organization served an 
additional, protective, function.
After the ill-fated "Rothschild villages," the 
Zionist settlement authorities, headed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, 
sought to establish large farms under public control rather 
than support a collective venture. The large, publicly-owned 
farms had the advantage of being able to attract the needed 
agrarian experts, conduct large experiments, and serve as 
training centers for new immigrants. The Zionist authorities
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were also short of funds, and these farms would require 
little capital expenditure in the initial phases (Darin- 
Drabkin: 1963)• In this scheme the workers received an 
equal wage, and the farms were managed by individuals with 
a higher salary. At the Kinneret farm the managers were 
concerned simply with economic profitability and even re­
sorted to the hiring of Arab labors Tensions increased and 
a strike of Jewish workers resulted.
In 1909 a historic step was taken by seven men and 
women at the Kinneret farm. They received permission from 
Dr. Ruppin to work a portion of the land themselves. They 
formed a collective community, no cash payments were distri­
buted, and at the end of the year they showed the only pro­
fit at Kinneret. A permanent collective was established 
there, which the members called Deganiah, and thus the first 
kibbutz was bom.
In 1911, at Merhavia in the Valley of Jezreel, a 
cooperative was organized by Professor Franz Oppenheimer. 
Here the workers were to be cooperative owners but the wages 
were determined by output. At both Kinneret and Merhavia 
the principle of differential wages proved to be a source 
of great conflict (Darin-Drabkin: 1963 and Sanders: 1965)*
After the collapse of the Oppenheimer cooperative, 
the settlement authorities had no choice but to support the 
kibbutz concept or Jewish settlement might have come to a 
complete standstill. At that time it meant "either settle­
ment in groups, or no settlement at all" (Infield; 1944:14).
Writing to the London offices of the Zionist Organization 
in 19129 Dr. Ruppin stated that "we had only one choices to 
do nothing or follow the inexpensive project of hacking the 
kihhutzim.
Thus, the creation and internal structure of the 
early kihhutzim may he explained* at least in part, simply 
in terms of expediency. However, the deep-seated commit­
ment of the founding fathers to the original values must 
also he placed in proper socio-historical perspective. The 
relationship of all these factors is at the heart of an 
understanding as to how the kihhutz came to he, and how and 
why kihhutz ideology has evolved through the years.
lie From Darin-Drahkin; 1963:66.
CHAPTER III 
ASCETICISM AND SIMPLICITY
There was a time when being a kibbutznik meant
living in tents or wooden huts, perhaps using furniture
made of masonite or empty oil drums, and having no personal
12possessions except a pair of slippers and a toothbrush.
Such were the conditions of existence for the early set­
tlers, without substantial improvement until the mid-1930s. 
Of course, many gave up and left for the cities, or left 
the country altogether, but the idealism and commitment of 
those who stayed sustained them through some very hard
12. Moshe Kerem's account of the first days of his 
own kibbutz described what life was like in the period which 
is known as "Commune A." "...cooking was done for a com­
munity of several hundred on primitive kerosene stoves. 
Boiling water was a matter of hours and water itself was 
severely rationed--through one cold water tap connected to 
a decrepit tank which required refilling three times a day. 
The dining area was a concrete-floored, cement-block-walled 
room sheltered from the elements by a ceiling constructed 
of various-sized pieces of leaky corrugated tin salvaged 
from abandoned British army installations. Tables for ten 
were made out of masonite and seating was on backless ben­
ches. Crockery was non-existent--one tin plate sufficing 
for all courses" (1965sl7)« The living accommodations were 
equally as bleaks "Tents--in my kibbutz I lived in one for 
over two years--gradually gave way to huts of corrugated 
aluminum which in turn were replaced by wooden bungalows and 
succeeded...by concrete-block houses, without sanitary con­
veniences, in which one room was allocated to a family"
(1965 * 21- 22)•
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times. They drained the marshes, cleared the land, survived 
malaria, withstood the Arahs, and ultimately made the desert 
blossom. The kibbutzim thus survived a difficult birth and 
prospered•
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is evi­
dence to suggest that the puritanical denial which marked 
the early days of the kibbutz movement stemmed, at least in 
part, from the conditions facing the early immigrants to 
Palestine. This point of view is summed up quite well by 
Stanley Maron, who stated that at the time "absolute aus­
terity was necessary for survival, and so the distribution 
of food, clothing, shelter, and other material fruits of 
labor was made on the scale of the minimum possible. Asce­
ticism in consumption became a standard practice" (1971:17)*
However, asceticism and simplicity also fulfilled a 
more subjective need in the hearts and minds of those early 
settlers, reflecting the shtetl experience.
The particular way the kibbutz has chosen 
to approach its goal of social justice has been 
through a morality of austerity. Two factors have 
guided this course. One, undoubtedly, has been the 
poverty which prevailed during the long formative 
years of the kibbutz. A morality which de-emphasizes 
the importance of possessions and stresses service 
to society is easier to accept in times when material 
things are hard to come by. But the second, and 
surely the most important reason for the selection 
of a morality of austerity was opposition to the 
moral degeneracy of European society, which had 
come to place more value on things than on people.
The kibbutz has been, in this moral respect as well 
as politically, economically, and socially, a reac­
tion against the injustices and untruthfulness of 
the society from which most of the members came 
(Maron; 1971:106).
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As the kibbutz movement established a firm economic 
base and showed signs of prosperity, changes occurred in 
the ideological system. Through it all, kibbutzniks have 
quite expectedly tried to hang on to certain ideas and 
ideals they considered essential to their way of life. 
However, these ideas have been continually reinterpreted in 
light of changes in the conditions of kibbutz life. Thus, 
on the one hand, there is an evolving society and, on the 
other hand, an evolving ideology. In the middle is the 
kibbutznik, who attempts to maintain a sense of consistency 
between the ideology and the real kibbutz world, while at 
the same time attempting to maintain the integrity and con­
sistency of the ideology itself. The process that seeks to 
mediate between the ideology and the real world is called 
"ideological elaboration" (Cornforth: 1972)•
Of all the original kibbutz values, the most com­
plete and far-reaching changes have probably occurred in
13the area of asceticism and simplicity, ^ causing perhaps 
the first great strain in kibbutz ideology. The problem 
confronting the kibbutz at that time was simply that the
13• Moshe Kerem described how his kibbutz had 
changed from the austere beginnings: "The kitchen is
ultra-modern and cooking is done in steam-.iacketed kettles. 
Dishes are washed mechanically and the stores contain me­
chanical potato peelers, walk-in refrigerators and deep­
freeze lockers. Tables for four are made of easy-to-clean 
formica. The hall can be turned into a movie theatre in 
the evening, and weekly general meetings as well as large 
cultural affairs all take place in it. In some kibbutzim, 
kibbutz offices and committee-rooms are housed in the same 
building. The soda tap which my kibbutz has .iust installed 
in the anteroom of our dining hall is a far cry from that 
lonely water faucet of 15 years ago" (1965:17-18).
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ideal no longer corresponded to the actual conditions of 
existence in the collectives. The image of the pioneer- 
farmer living a simple and natural life, carving a Jewish 
National Homeland out of the desert through sweat and toil, 
had been replaced, to a considerable degree, with the pres­
ence of automatic dishwashers, air-conditioning, private 
apartments complete with kitchenette and bathroom and, alas, 
swimming pools and paid vacations abroad.
This situation caused a good deal of tension within 
kibbutz ideology as two of the original values were even­
tually abandoned.. There was great socio-historical signi­
ficance attached to these values and, as such, they held an 
important place in the ideological mentality of the first 
generation member.
However, this was not at all the case with the 
second generation, the first generation actually born in 
the kibbutz. They saw asceticism and simplicity as values 
for survival and not as goals in themselves. They were 
sufficiently removed from the shtetl experience of their 
parents to fail to identify with values derived from that 
experience. And so it has been with each succeeding gener­
ation born into the kibbutz, idealism gives way to pragmatism.
The process of aging itself inevitably requires the 
ascetic and simple ethic to be relaxed somewhat with the 
first generation (Talmon: 19&1 and Friedmann: 1968). Older 
members were just not able to tolerate what in their youth 
seemed to be great adventure and fun. In the winter they
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required warmer clothes, perhaps an extra blanket on the 
bed, had no desire to return to sleeping in tents, and 
generally could not indefinitely endure privation. Thus, 
asceticism was viewed by some of the older members as pri­
marily a virtue of the young. On this point, Golomb and 
Katz (1970) suggested that the older generation as a rule 
did not even see asceticism as desirable for their children.
Perhaps the most important factor explaining the 
passing of asceticism and simplicity was that as the kibbutz 
became more firmly established it became apparent that these 
values were inconsistent with economic and material develop­
ment, to which the movement was also committed and, indeed, 
had to be committed to in order to insure its survival in 
the larger (capitalist) Israeli society. The kibbutz move­
ment has always been preoccupied, perhaps even obsessed, 
with the ideal of productive self-labor. In emphasizing 
productivity, of which individual accomplishment and achieve­
ment are parts, at least a modicum of economic success could 
reasonably be expected. This economic success, accelerating 
after the late 1930s, created modes of consumption and con­
ditions of existence which were considerably removed from 
the austere and simple beginnings (Kerem: 1965; Friedmann: 
1968; Leon: 1968). Specifically, the notion of productive 
labor dictated the eventual shift from an agricultural to 
an industrial economy, thereby creating a value dilemma with 
ideal of farming as a way of life, upon which asceticism and 
simplicity were predicated.
LEGITIMIZING CHANGE
Clearly, the kihhutz faced a dilemmas how could 
changes in the material conditions of existence he recon­
ciled with the original conception of asceticism? Three 
alternatives appeared to he open to the kihhutz movement.
First, the viability of the original tenets could 
have been reaffirmed, while acknowledging that significant 
departures from these values have occurred. This, of 
course, would involve the tacit admission that the kibbutz 
is evolving, or has already evolved, into a different sort 
of collective experience.
Second, the original tenets could have been reaf­
firmed, while a departure from the values of asceticism and 
simplicity denied. Nowhere does this appear in the liter­
ature, although Golomb and Katz (1970) do maintain that the 
kibbutz remains "relatively" austere and simple in compari­
son to life in the larger Israeli society.
Third, the original tenets could have been rejected 
as no longer essential to the kibbutz way of life, or as 
never really being value positions in and of themselves, 
while at the same time acknowledging and legitimizing the 
extensive changes in the material conditions of kibbutz life.
According to Cornforth (1972) the latter alternative 
comes closest to fulfilling the requirements of ideological 
elaboration. By eliminating asceticism and simplicity as
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essential values, kibbutz ideology was no longer open to
criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure
1^to reckon with the facts.
Arguments against asceticism and simplicity as 
essential values frequently include the contention that 
ideas embraced during the infant stages of the kibbutz are 
not, by definition, essential to the kibbutz< They may con­
stitute means to ends, rather than being ends in themselves, 
a fact not apparent to kibbutz members at that time due to 
the severe conditions of existence which tended to blur the 
distinction between ends and means. As economic and material 
conditions improved, certain values became inconsistent with 
the course of progress in the kibbutz, at which time they 
were considered, by definition, to be means rather than ends 
in themselves.
The reformulation of certain values from ends to 
means has been justified by pointing to the great structural 
diversity of the kibbutzim throughout Israel, indicating
1^. This brings to mind Mannheim's conception of 
the ideological mentality, and the three fundamental types 
thereof. Only the final type involves conscious deception 
and this is not relevant to the case of the kibbutz. The 
mentality at work in the kibbutz is best understood by
examining both types one and two: .we may regard the case
in which the conceiving and thinking subject is prevented 
from becoming aware of the incongruence of his ideas with 
reality by the whole body of axioms involved in his histori­
cally and socially determined thought. As a second type of
ideological mentality we may present the "cant mentality," 
which is characterized by the fact that historically it has 
the possibility of uncovering the incongruence between its 
ideas and its conduct, but instead conceals these insights 
in response to certain vital-emotional interests" (1936:195)*
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that change and self-evaluation are on-going processes in 
the kibbutz; the means-ends dichotomy is simply a natural 
outgrowth of this process.
It will be difficult to find overwhelming 
similarity between the kibbutz at the present time 
and its original, basic form. The two differ in 
practically all spheres of life: in size, in econo­
mic structure, in their sources of employment, in 
their style of life, in the organization of their 
governing institutions, in their methods of educa­
tion, in their estimation of the family and its 
role, and so on. Clear changes have taken place In 
every kibbutz--especially in the veteran ones— and 
there are noticeable differences between kibbutzim: 
there are those with industrial ventures, and those 
without; some are large, and others small; in some 
children sleep in special children's houses; some 
employ hired workers, while others do not; some 
depend upon regional centers, while others have no 
such nearby institutions; some are religious, 
others purely secular; some follow a "rightist," 
others a "leftist," ideology; they allocate goods 
to their members for consumption on the basis of 
"need," of "norms," or of "budget" (Ben David; 
1971:76-77).
Pointing to a specific example, the optimum size of
i
the kibbutz was at one time a crucial question upon which 
the very nature of kibbutz life was thought to rest. Ben 
David (1971) pointed to this past issue as a means of show­
ing how certain values, once thought to be essential, have
15in fact been shown to be peripheral to kibbutz life.
In this case, the kibbutz
15* I use the phrase "have in fact been shown" 
advisedly since ideological elaboration in the kibbutz, or 
anywhere else for that matter, seeks to understand only if 
it is self-serving. Unpleasant realities have a tendency 
to be ignored or explained away.
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has obeyed a certain inner logic of its own which 
contradicts the opinions held by disputants; neither 
is it small as had been envisaged by the dreamers 
of the ’’small groups” ("the kibbutz should be 
small, by nature of a family, with eight or ten 
members..." Zvi Schatz said at one time. Later the 
desirable number was set at 20 to 30, then 60 to 
80, and later at 100 to 150. From time to time 
limits were broadened, various ideological justifi­
cations being presented), nor as large as the vision 
of the "large group" (S. Lavie at one time called it 
"the large and growing kibbutz" in his explanation 
of the kibbutz established on 3»000 dunams of land, 
with each dunam providing the livelihood for one 
individual). At present time the most common kib­
butz size is between 100 and A00 members (1971s 
77- 78).16
16. Georg Simmel considered "one of the most ab­
stract characteristics of a group 1 the mere number of its 
participants. He examines forms of group process and 
structural arrangement insofar as these derive from sheer 
quantitative relationships" (Coser; 1971:186). "In small 
groups, members typically have a chance to interact direct­
ly with one another; once the group exceeds a relatively 
limited size, such interaction must be mediated through 
formal arrangements. In order to come to grips with the 
increasing complexity of relationships among large numbers 
of individuals, the group must create special organs to help 
the patterning of interactions among its members. Thus, no 
large group can function without the creation of offices, 
the differentiation of status positions, and the delegation 
of tasks and responsibilities. This is the reason larger 
groups become societies of unequals: in order to maintain 
themselves, they must be structurally differentiated. But 
this means that the larger group "gains its unity, which 
finds expression in the group organs and political notions 
and ideals, only at the price of a great distance between 
all of these structures and the individual."
The smaller the group, the greater the involvement 
of its members, for interaction among a few tends to be more 
intense than interaction among many; if only because of the 
greater frequency of contact. Inversely, the larger the 
group, the weaker the participation of its members; chances 
are high that they will be involved with only a segment of 
their personalities instead of as whole human beings. The 
larger group demands less of its members, and also creates 
"objective" structures that confront individuals with super­
personal powers: "For it is this large number which para­
lyzes the individual element and which causes the general 
element to emerge at such a distance from it that it seems
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The evolution of* the institution of collective edu­
cation also has been used as a case in point that the kib­
butz movement has been positive and dynamic in its ability 
to adapt and change.
The members of the first kibbutz had given 
no thought ,to the structure and development of 
education that would be in keeping with their con­
victions. The problem was confronted only with the 
birth of children. The primary desire of the women 
who had given birth was to retain their status of 
equality with men and not be forced into the tradi­
tional Western mold of housekeeper, kichen worker, 
and child-raiser. The question of what to do with 
and for the children became a matter of serious 
debate within individual kibbutzim and at conven­
tions of women workers. The matter became resolved 
in principle only after several years, when it was 
determined that the children should be raised and 
educated in communal fashion (Sturm; 1971s107).
By pointing to the numerous structural changes 
brought about in the course of kibbutz development, the im­
plication was that, because the kibbutz movement was flour­
ishing economically and was still instrumental in helping 
to preserve the State of Israel, a hard core of essential
that it could exist by itself, without any individuals, to 
whom in fact it often enough is antagonistic."
Although through its formal arrangement the larger 
group confronts the individual with a distant and alien 
power, it liberates him from close control and scrutiny 
precisely because it creates greater distance among its 
members. In the dvad, the immediacy of the we is not yet 
marred by the intrusion of structural constraints, and... 
in the triad two members may constrain the third and force 
their will upon him. In the small group, however, the 
coalitions and majorities that act to constrain individual 
action are mitigated by the immediacy of participation. In 
the large group, the differentiated organs constrain the 
individual through their "objective" powers, even though 
they allow freedom from the group through segmental rather 
than total involvement" (Ibid., p. 188).
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values had endured through the years of change. Thus, the 
task facing kibbutz ideologists in the past, as well as in 
the present, has been to clarify which values are indeed 
essential and which are non-essential to the kibbutz way of 
life and; furthermore, to interpret those essential values 
in order that they might be consistent with the course of 
kibbutz development.
This reformulation (Diamond: 1957? Arians 19^8;
Golomb and Katz: 1970; Azania: 1971? Ben Davids 1971? Maor: 
1971? Maron: 1971? Shenker: 1971? Sturm: 1971? and Pawels 
1972) was necessary in light of the fact that excessive 
idealization of kibbutz origins caused the simple fact of 
change to be perceived as an ideological crisis threatening 
the very existence of the collectives.
The reformulation gained articulation and consis­
tency in the early 1970s, responding to what Ben David (1971) 
saw as two very pragmatic considerations:
...the conclusion is that the desire to preserve 
the kibbutz necessitates the strict maintenance of 
certain conditions and of the basic ideology. A 
certain degree of structural and ideological flexi­
bility is essential and even desirable for the sake 
of stability, but not an excessive degree capable 
of distorting the very fundamentals (1971*76).
Implicit in this statement is the notion that 
"structural and ideological flexibility" will literally have 
to be created, since in the excessive idealization of kibbutz 
origins there was no room for value change without a concom­
itant ideological crisis. In an apparent attempt to fulfill
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this need in kibbutz ideology, the rank ordering of value 
principles was undertaken. "Here it first becomes necessary 
to draw the line between virtue and necessity, for much of 
what had been initially regarded as ideologically germane 
turned out to be mere pragmatic need raised to the power of 
a moral injunction" (Pawel; 1972:23)*
We m u s t . odistinguish between values that 
are ends in themselves and values that are only 
instruments for the realization of these ends. The 
sole validity of the second kind is as means; they 
are not absolute values in themselves.... There is 
a tendency... in the kibbutz to blur the distinction 
between the two kinds of values and to mistake means 
for ends (Shenker; 1971?21).
Azania's (1971) reference to "fundamental socialist 
values" seemed to provide at least a partial answer as to 
what the criteria would be for differentiating between ends 
and means. It seems reasonable that any reformulation of 
values will reflect what Merkl (19&7) called the "vital core 
of socialist thinking," i.e., complete social and economic 
equality, economic efficiency, peaceful cooperation instead 
of all-out competition, the abolition of private property, 
and some form of communal living.
While it is certainly correct to say the kibbutz is 
a socialist society, it is also a unique socialist experi­
ment due to its Zionist roots. It is, in the estimation of 
Diamond, "a highly specialized and unique society established 
by people of a particular type at a particular time, in re­
sponse to and in fulfillment of particular needs" (1957:71). 
Indeed, Diamond stated that the major historical motivation
of the kibbutz movement was a reaction of Jews to shtetl 
culture. "Those pioneers who did not come from the tech­
nically delimited shtetl areas were reacting against paral­
lel or convergent elements in their own milieux, against 
what can be called a more diffused version of shtetl culture" 
(1957?7^)« In light of these factors at work in the crea­
tion of the kibbutz movement, it seems rather myopic to 
characterize the movement in the most general terms. In 
other words, how can the line between virtue and necessity 
be drawn in such a manner as to align only fundamental 
socialist values on the side of virtue, when the historical 
experience of the Jews may, in fact, account for other 
values being pursued as values in their own right? Thus, 
looking at the kibbutz movement as a particular kind of 
socialist experiment, particular values not accounted for 
in the core of socialist thinking may nevertheless be fun­
damental values. The problem of criteria remains.
The lack of criteria allows kibbutz ideologists to 
draw the line between ends and means, or between virtue and 
necessity, in such a way that virtually all changes in the 
sixty year history of the kibbutz movement can be chalked 
up as changes in means. Thus, a good deal of self-serving 
retrospect seems to be at work here. Writing in the early 
1970s and looking back over a half-century of considerable 
change in the kibbutz, how is an individual committed to the 
kibbutz way of life likely to perceive such changes? 
Obviously, he will be hard-pressed to see changes in the
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basic principles, for that would be an admission that "kib- 
butzness" in the kibbutz had deteriorated. During the ®40s 
and * 50s, asceticism, simplicity, and farming as a way of 
life became outmoded as value positions. A reformulation 
of principles simply redefined "basic" principles to elimi­
nate those tenets in the original kibbutzim which had been 
breached in the course of kibbutz development.
Golomb and Katz (1970) and Ben David (1971)? in 
particular, have developed detailed typologies in attempting 
to categorize certain values as ends and others as means.
Ben David posited the existence of two levels of kibbutz 
ideology. One level was that of basic concepts, making up 
the ideological backbone of the kibbutz, i.e., collective 
living, equality, mutual responsibility, and self-labor.
These basic ideological tenets "must be maintained with 
great precision since (they) constitute the very justifica­
tion for the existence of the kibbutz" (1971*70).
The second level was that of means, incorporating 
"the seed of change and...almost always given ideological 
justification on the strength of functional reasons" (1971* 
79)• These value positions may be modified or abandoned at 
any time as dictated by pragmatic considerations. Ben David 
went on to say that in the final analysis
kibbutz ideology has proven itself adaptable, except 
for its very general ideological backbone.... This 
was the strength of this ideology and thus it helped 
to preserve stability in the kibbutz. Concerning a 
number of subjects this ideology has changed from 
one extreme to the other, and this happened during 
the very periods of glory. It happened in connection
with the size of the kihhutz, the composition of 
the farm and employment, the family and education, 
principles of consumption, the standard of living, 
centralism or decentralization in the movement, and 
so on (1971:76)*
Using this means-ends dichotomy to select out what 
he thought were values of marginal Importance, Ben David 
concluded that, "in spite, of (some changes) one can observe 
continuity in everything that is essential in the kibbutz; 
its very existence proves this" (197-1?76). As a point of 
fact, the physical existence of the two hundred-odd kib­
butzim has absolutely nothing to do with the question of 
whether the ideological integrity of the communes has been 
preserved. In fact, Ben David does not reject the notion 
that changes in substance have occurred: "The determination 
to maintain a certain social structure, certain social 
relationships, even under unfavorable conditions, made com­
promise necessary regarding essential and basic matters" 
(1971s76). This is obviously at odds with his previous 
position vis-a-vis changes "regarding essential and basic 
matters" and indicates an attempt to obfuscate the issue 
concerning the real nature and extent of ideological change 
in the kibbutz.
In looking at Ben David’s level of fundamental con­
cepts, the connotations attached to these concepts have 
shifted over the years. In stating that these values must 
be maintained with great precision, however, Ben David pre­
cludes the possibility of even slight changes being incor­
porated at this level of kibbutz ideology. But changes have,
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in fact, taken place at this level (Golomb and Katzs 1970).
A second typology, actually preceding Ben David, is more 
sophisticated in dealing with the problem of justifying 
change.
In this scheme (Golomb and Katz: 1970), virtually 
any change in the kibbutz can be accounted for without 
destroying "kibbutzness." Distinctions were made between 
values which have been abandoned, values which have remained 
unchanged, and values which have been "creatively modified.” 
The first category is for non-essential values and the 
fundamental principles fall into the latter two groups. 
Farming as a way of life, asceticism, and simplicity are 
put into the first category; voluntarism and direct democ­
racy into the second; and equality, the dignity of work, 
and communality into the third category.
What is so interesting and significant in this 
typology is the use of the term "creative modification." 
Golomb and Katz defined it as a "reformulation which adapts 
to new situations but does not destroy the basic ideological 
principle involved. There is no compromise in the literal 
sense of a concession which violates the basic doctrine, as 
in the case of compromised virtue" (1970:46). Golomb and 
Katz sought to make a distinction between ideological modi­
fication and ideological change. Just when a value that has 
been modified becomes a value that has been changed is a 
subjective determination. The difference in terminology is 
a difference in degree, not in kind. Again, the problem of
establishing criteria remains. The result of all this seems 
to be that '’creative modification" becomes a rather conven­
ient category into which possibly ideologically embarrassing 
changes may be cast. Again there seems to be an attempt to 
obfuscate the issue concerning the real nature and extent 
of ideological change in the kibbutz*
How was this reinterpretation of values accomplished 
I believe the answer lies in the structure of kibbutz ideol­
ogy itself. It has never been a system free from inconsis­
tencies and contradictions. These ambiguities have, of 
course, compounded problems in attempting to mold the ideas 
into a coherent philosophy.
This system is not, as it often seems, some 
well-integrated and unchanging system of basic con­
cepts towards which the members of the community are 
oriented and which they tended to follow more con­
scientiously in the past than in the present. Con­
trary to this popular opinion, the ideology of the 
kibbutz is a heterogeneous system composed of ele­
ments stemming from Socialism, Zionism, humanistic 
ethics and sometimes religion, which are integrated 
only in a most strenuous way; as a result, the sys­
tem contains many potential internal contradictions 
which, under certain circumstances, create dilemmas 
of decision and action for the members (Cohen;
1966 :^ ) .
As a result, Cohen concluded that some of the changes taking 
place in the kibbutz can be understood "not as results of 
external pressures upon the value system, but as rearrange­
ments within the value system itself forced upon it by its 
inner logic, its Eigengesetzlichkeit" (1966:^). Menachem 
Rosner added that this incoherence permitted "an elastic 
and many-sided interpretation of the original values of the
kibbutz, all of which might be considered legitimate" 
(1971:92).
Exactly what did Cohen mean when he talked about 
the inner logic of kibbutz ideology? Basically, the kib­
butzim were always dedicated to economic progress--progress 
both of the movement itself and of the Jewish people as a 
nation--and herein lies the crisis In the kibbutz and, 
specifically, the problem facing Ideological elaboration.
On the one hand, the kibbutz is committed to modernity in 
its technological and economic organization and, on the 
other hand, to primitivity in its social relations. The 
problem facing the kibbutz is simply that it has embraced 
two fundamentally contradictory value positions, progress 
and communality, and yet its survival and integrity depend 
to a great extent on how successfully it maintains the com­
mitment to each. The whole process of ideological elabor­
ation is an attempt to render compatible these divergent 
trends.
While it is true that kibbutz ideology contains 
many potential internal inconsistencies, these were not 
fully developed, nor was the development clearly foreseen, 
in the early days of settlement. However, as the kibbutz 
movement developed economically, these potential inconsis­
tencies came into clearer focus. In short, the ideas and 
ideals underlying the kibbutz way of life were least incon­
sistent in the period of extreme hardship and austerity.
The basic Marxist position is that "ideological
development is...governed by the material development of 
society" (Cornforth; 1972*69). Furthermore, "...the causes 
impelling ideological development in one or another direc­
tion are always to be found, in the last analysis, not 
within the sphere of ideological development itself but in 
the sphere of the conditions of material life" (Cornforth; 
1972s69). There is some validity to the theory of economic 
determinism. However, it should be remembered that the sys 
tern of ideas that underlies kibbutz life is a peculiar 
admixture, and the ideas themselves have been significant 
forces of social change.
CHAPTER IY 
AGRICULTURE * INDUSTRY* AND HIRED LABOR
The early kibbutzim were agricultural communities. 
The. first steps toward industrialization were taken in the 
1930s when small workshops were established to meet the 
needs of agriculture. By 1975> about 1?0 of the 225 kib­
butzim had some type of industrial enterprise, and many had
17more than one. ( It is now estimated that about one-half 
of the total income of the kibbutz movement is derived from 
industrial sources, although only 25 per cent of its members 
are actually employed in the industrial sector. Industrial­
ization in the kibbutz, itself a breach of the original 
values, brought with it a breach of much greater importance, 
that of hired labor.
The early, agricultural emphasis of the kibbutz
17. The various areas of manufacturing and the 
number of kibbutzim engaged in each, as of 1975» included: 
metal manufacturing (67)1 plastic and rubber products (39)» 
textile and leather products (26), electronics and electri­
cal products (25), and food processing (21). Other impor­
tant areas are printing, wood products, building materials 
and chemicals. The total number of industrial workers has 
increased from 5>000 in i960 to about 13,000 at present.
Most of the plants are quite small, 75 per cent employ fewer 
than 50 workers and 17 per cent employ 50 to 100. Kibbutz 
industry produces about 7 per cent of the nation*s indus­
trial output, with about 3 per cent of the population 
(Stoddart: 1975)-
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reflected both pragmatic and socio-historical considera­
tions. First, the dream of establishing a Jewish National 
Homeland could not have been accomplished without establish­
ing a viable Jewish agricultural sector (Leons 196A and 
Crowns 1965)•
Second, the notion of hard, physical 3.abor, origi­
nally manifested in farming as a way of life, was central 
to the kibbutz movement as a means of personal redemption 
and national survival for the Jewish people (Diamonds 1957 r 
Talmon: 1961? Golomb and Katz; 1970; and Shenker: 1971)• 
Diamond suggested that physical labor was, in part, "a 
ritual of expiation for the personally perceived sin of 
parasitism” (1957*81-82).
Strenuous work, a dire economic necessity, 
has become much more than that; it has been endowed 
with deep meaning and dignity and invested with a 
quasi-religious seriousness, as an important instru­
ment for the realization of social and national 
ideals as well as an ultimate value in itself. The 
idealized figure of a farmer-pioneer tiller of the 
soil has become one of the main symbols of personal 
redemption and of national revival (Talmon; 1961:285).
Barry Shenker stated further that control over one's life 
was one of the conditions of attaining the freedom that Jews 
sought, and work provided this opportunity. "By this means 
a working man grants himself both the objective conditions 
for self-realization and the subjective feeling (no less 
important) that he is himself gaining his freedom" (1971*30). 
The Jewish Ethic found in the kibbutz is not unlike Weber's 
Protestant Ethic.
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From the early 1920s through the mid~1940s the kib­
butz movement became more firmly established; the agricul­
tural economy expanded through increasing mechanization. 
However, it was during this period that agriculture expanded 
to a point beyond which available land and water reserves 
would not support continued growth (Cohen: 1966; Darom:
1968; and Friedmann: 1968). In the mid-1950s a new problem 
arose in the form of food surpluses in Israel which com­
pounded the already critical situation in the kibbutz 
economy (Shatil: 1970). In addition, throughout its history 
the kibbutz had to compete with the larger (capitalist) 
Israeli society, not only for new members, but for economic 
survival as well. Especially after the establishment of 
the State in 1948 this competition was spelled out in terms 
of industry. Thus, the kibbutz had to make adjustments or 
face stagnation; and, as a result, farming as a way of life 
ceased to be valued as an end in itself.
The eventual breach with the ideal of farming was 
facilitated by the fact that farming itself had changed 
considerably:
The change (was) not as abrupt as might be antici­
pated in that farming itself became specialized and 
mechanized. The poultry branch, common to most 
kibbutzim, is a highly specialized, mass-production 
type of farming which is considerably removed from 
the idyllic conception of the back-to-nature move­
ment (Golomb and Katz; 1970:43-44).
Not only had farming changed, but the young Jews 
who founded the kibbutz movement were also becoming its
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elderly citizens. The glorification of hard, physical labor 
meant that aging was a physical and a moral decline® In a 
system that recognized worth and allocated prestige on the 
basis of the ability to be productive, aging was viewed as 
a gradual privation of grace. Thus* the redefinition of 
productive self-labor, to include industrial work, greatly 
increased the ability of the kibbutz to provide satisfying 
jobs for elderly members of the first generation.
Industrialization...(provides) jobs...for 
members whom age or illness has made unfit for land 
work. In the environment in which such high moral 
prestige is attached to work, to aging haverim total 
retirement would be both economically and psycholo­
gically harmful, and even unthinkable (Friedmann; 
1968 s 57).
This redefinition also provided greater opportunity 
for job satisfaction and individual development to those 
members of the second generation just entering the kibbutz 
labor market.
In addition, because most kibbutz industries are 
small units with advanced technology, and because the kib­
butz has always tried to maximize job satisfaction, there 
is minimal depersonalization, alienation, or loss of self­
esteem one would normally associate with industrial work 
(Golomb and Katz: 1970; Rosner: 1971; and Stoddart: 1975)*
As opposed to the transformation of an 
independent farmer into a hired worker, with all the 
change of social status implied, the cooperative- 
collectivistic industrialization enables the preser­
vation of the workers1 feeling of independence with­
in the democratic framework of management of the 
enterprise and his participation in the decision 
(Rosner; 1971*55)*
The introduction of industry was also justified on 
the basis that while it opened up avenues for economic ex­
pansion and improved the standard of living in the kibbutz, 
it was not intended that industrial ventures should be
financied at the expense of the full development of the
i ftagricultural sector (Darom: 1968 and Rosner: 1971).
"Hardly any kibbutz would deny the principle of "agriculture 
first" or deliberately forego the development of its full 
agricultural potential in order to free manpower and capital 
for other sectors of its economy" (Daromj 1968:18).
One major justification of industrializing the kib­
butz relates back to the notion of the inner logic of kib­
butz ideology. By definition, the movement is dedicated to 
the personal and national regeneration of the Jewish people. 
In the early days, farming was viewed as nourishment for 
the soul of the Jew, and it was also what the kibbutzniks 
had to learn to do to survive. But as the dream of the 
State became a reality, the realization came that continued 
growth of the kibbutz movement ultimately required indus­
trialization. Thus, when it was expedient to emphasize 
farming as a way of life, and to view progress, growth, and 
achievement in the context of farming, there was ideological
18. In contrast, Blumberg's more sociological obser 
vation suggested that the future of the kibbutz will, 
indeed, depend more and more on industrialization: "The fac­
tories (in) the kibbutz represent a new and inevitable direc 
tion in the economic activity of the collectives. In every 
industrializing country, of course, the importance of agri­
culture diminishes, and to adapt to changing economic 
circumstances the kibbutz must industrialize" (1972:16).
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justification for it. When it later became necessary for 
the kibbutz to justify the introduction of industry, It was 
emphasized that the ideals of self-labor and, more impor­
tantly, progress were not necessarily limited to farming, 
simply because heretofore they had been. Farming was only 
one way In which self-labor and progress could be expressed.
Weintraub, Lissak, and Azmon observed that “at the 
basis of the kibbutz there lay a fundamental entrepreneurial 
image, embodying sustained initiative and absorption of 
change, as well as constant experimentation, and allowing 
it to give scope to the "large business" potential embodied 
in its projected structure" (1969*73)• They stated further 
that "much of this drive to constant innovation was embodied 
in the basic ideology of the settlers which, conceiving of 
rationality, growth, and achievement as values in themselves, 
fostered improvement and experimentation" (1969*91)•
The introduction of industry enabled the kibbutz to 
become economically more profitable, improve the standard 
of living of its members, and find productive and satisfying 
work for its young and old members. However, the economic 
reach of the kibbutz exceeded its- grasp: the expansion of 
the movement far out-stripped its demographic growth and the 
kibbutz was compelled to hire outside labor to keep the eco­
nomic structure intact.
The employment of hired labor by the kibbutz move­
ment is perhaps the most serious breach of original values 
(Yissakhav: 19*19; Arnold: 1950; Aurbach: 1953; Vallier: 1962;
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Gelbs 196 ?^ Leons 196^1 Crowns 1965; Kerems 1965.1 Sanders? 
1965; Stern: 1955; Daroms 1958* Friedmann: 1968; and Golomb 
and Katz: 1970).
The employment of hired labor in the agricultural 
sector has been kept at low levels? but, in the industrial 
sector the percentages have been high for the last fifteen 
or twenty years. In 196 ,^ hired labor reached its numerical 
peak at which time only 37 per cent of the work force in 
kibbutz industry came from within the kibbutz and 63 per 
cent came from outside. By 1971, the percentage of outside 
workers had dropped to 52 per cent, with no realistic expec­
tation that the situation will ever be brought under control. 
The percentages of hired workers varies among the three 
ma.ior kibbutz federations, from a low of 21 per cent in the 
Kibbutz Artzi to a high of 76 per cent (Stoddart: 1975)•
There has been little attempt at the ideological 
.1 ustification of the use of hired labor in the kibbutz. The 
breach with kibbutz values is clear and of such magnitude 
that it defies a coverup. Hired labor is simply viewed as 
a necessary evil and Is tolerated, If not accepted, by the 
kibbutz movement.
This brings us to an important point. Is there a 
key to understanding the evolution of kibbutz society? I 
believe it is safe to say there is no one key, no one per­
spective, that adequately explains social change in the kib­
butz, but there are several which will place the kibbutz in 
proper sociological perspective.
THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
The explanation of* stability and change in human 
societies has -long been a major concern of sociologists.. 
Some of the more notable explanations are in the old socio­
logical tradition of typing social entities antithetically, 
i.e., Maine *s status society and contract society; Tonnies' 
community and society; Durkheim? s mechanical and organic 
solidarity; Maclver's communal and assoclational relations; 
Sorokin's familistic and contractual relations; Becker's 
sacred and secular societies; and, Redfield's folk-urban 
continuum.
Herbert Spencer's primary concern was with the evo­
lution of social structure and social institutions, and in 
this analysis his sociology was inextricably tied to biolo­
gical reasoning. He defined evolution as "a change from a
state of relatively indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to
. . . 20a state of relatively definite, coherent, heterogeneity."
It was a universal process which explained the "earliest 
changes which the universe at large is supposed to have
19. This tradition actually dates back to the phi­
losophical speculation of the Classical Greeks and to the 
age of Confucius. See Charles Loomis and John McKinney's 
introduction to Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, 
trans. and ed. Charles Loomis (New York: Harper and Row,
1957).
20. From The Evolution of Society: Selections from 
Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert 
Cameiro (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967),
p. xvii.
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undergone... and those latest changes which we trace In
society and the products of social life" (Spencer? 1898s
337). Thus, Spencer viewed the evolution of human societies
as an example of universal natural law.
The notion of increasing size applied to organic and
social life as well. ' "Societies, like living bodies, begin
as germs--originate from masses which are extremely minute
in comparison with the masses some of them eventually 
21reach." Societal growth results from a population in­
crease either "by simple multiplication of units," or by
22"union of groups, and again by union of groups of groups."
Increases in the size of organic or social units 
brings with it a corresponding differentiation of structure 
and functions. "At first the unlikeness among its groups 
of units is inconspicuous in number and degree, but as popu­
lation augments, divisions and subdivisions become more 
numerous and more decided.
As(society) grows, its parts become unlike: 
it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts 
simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. 
These activities are not simply different, but the 
differences are so related as to make one another 
possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes 
mutual dependence of parts. And the mutually depen­
dent parts, living by and for another, form an ag­
gregate constituted on the same general principle 
as is an individual organism. ^
21. Ibid., p . 9•
22. Ibid., p . 10.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
2b, Ibid., p. 8 .
56 6
"This division of labor, first dwelt on by political econo­
mists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by 
biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they 
called the "physiological division of labor," is that which
2 5in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole.
Spencer suggested that the evolutionary growth of 
society, like organic growth, involved increasing size, 
increasing structural and functional differentiation, and 
increasing interdependence and hence integration of the parts. 
To Spencer, evolutionary growth simply resulted in integra­
tion at a more complex developmental level.
"Describing not merely the range of human existence, 
but what to him appeared as an irreversible historical 
trend, Durkheim in his study of the division of labor 
polarized society into two types."
The first type was what he termed the mechanically 
solidary society, which prevail to the extent that "ideas 
and tendencies common to all members of the society are 
greater in number and intensity than those which pertain 
personally to each member. This solidarity can grow only 
in inverse ratio to personality" (Durkheim; 1956:129). 
Furthermore, "solidarity which comes from likeness is at 
its maximum when the collective conscience completely
25. Ibid., p. 5-
26. From John McKinney, "The Application of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft As Related to Other Typolo­
gies," in Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, trans. 
and ed. Charles Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1957),
P- 13.
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envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points 
with it" (Durkheim? 1956s130)«
People are homogeneous mentally and morally, 
hence communities are uniform and nonatomized. It 
is in this type of society that a totality of be­
liefs and sentiments common to all men exists, and 
which Durkheim called the conscience collective.
This conscience is characterized by the attributes 
of exteriority and constraint. Exteriority refers 
to the fact that the conscience as totality is 
never a product of the members of society at any 
one point in time; constraint has reference to the 
significant point that the membership of a mechan­
ically solidary society cannot morally refute its 
collective conscience. Offense against the col­
lective conscience is moral offense and is punish­
able by repressive law.27
The organically solidary society, on the other hand, 
is held together precisely because of the differentiation 
of parts. "The division of labor is a result of the strug­
gle for existence, and the specialization of labor stimu­
lated individualism and differentiation. People in the
society are heterogeneous; their mental and moral similari-
28ties have disappeared."
Each element in a differentiated society is 
less strongly tied to common collective routines, 
even though it may be bound with equal rigor to the 
differentiated and specialized tasks and roles that 
characterize systems of organic solidarity. While 
the individual elements of such a system have less 
in common, they are nevertheless much more inter­
dependent than under mechanical solidarity. Pre­
cisely because they now engage in differentiated 
ways of life and in specialized activities, the 
members are largely dependent upon one another and
27. Ibid., p. 13.
28. Ibid . , p. 13.
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networks of solidarity can develop between them.
In such systems, there can be some release from ex­
ternal controls, but such release is in tune with, 
not in conflict with, the high degree of dependence 
of individuals on their fellows (Coser; 1971:132)*
"The change from mechanical solidarity to organic
solidarity does not result in an automatic loss of con-
29science collective, but an alteration in its form."
In his earlier work, Durkheim stated that 
strong systems of common belief characterize mechan­
ical solidarity in primitive types, of society, and 
that organic solidarity, resulting from the progres­
sive increase in the division of labor and hence 
increased mutual dependence, needed fewer common 
beliefs to tie members to this society. He later 
revised this view and stressed that even those sys­
tems with a highly developed organic solidarity 
still needed a common faith, a common collective 
conscience, if they were not to disintegrate into a 
heap of mutually antagonistic and self-seeking 
individuals.
The mature Durkheim realized that only if 
all members of a society were anchored to common 
sets of symbolic representations, to common assump­
tions about the world around them, could moral unity 
be assured. Without them, Durkheim argued, any 
society, whether primitive or modern, was bound to 
degenerate and decay (Coserj 1971:132).
I believe that the kibbutz movement illustrates some 
of the concepts of social evolution put forth by Spencer and 
Durkheim.
The first small communes with undeveloped 
farms and, perhaps, up to 50 members, had no need 
for distribution of functions. It is reported that 
every evening the whole group together planned work 
for the next day, and a member who needed some money 
for going to town found it in a certain drawer. But 
the kibbutz grew, their economy became far more
29* Ibid., p. 14.
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complicated, and needs diversified. A kibbutz vil­
lage of the present, with a population of 500-1,000, 
and an economy comprising agriculture and Industry 
with a yearly turnover of millions of dollars...is 
in need of an efficient and properly functioning 
organization (Shatil; 1970:27).
Today, the formal kibbutz structure is made up of 
three elements. Administration of the kibbutz rests with 
the Secretariat, the Work Coordinator, and the various Work 
Team Leaders. The General Assembly and the various Work 
Teams are operated on the principle of direct democracy, 
and numerous committees are set up in an advisory capacity.
The General Assembly is the symbol of direct democ­
racy in the kibbutz, in which each member is accorded one 
vote. It normally meets once a week and discusses matters 
which do not pertain to the normal operation of the kibbutz.
The various Work Teams are run democratically and 
have considerable autonomy In their individual operations, 
although ma.ior decisions must necessarily reflect the larger 
economic plan of the collective.
The Secretariat consists of three full-time individ­
uals, the Farm Manager, the Treasurer, and the Social Secre­
tary (and perhaps a few additional members which varies 
from kibbutz to kibbutz), and is the supreme authority in 
terms of the on-going economic operation of the community.
The system of committees in the kibbutz (there are 
perhaps 10-15 in a developed collective) is important 
because it involves a large percentage of the members in a 
system of social responsibility. The most important are the
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Economic Committee, the Work Committee, the committee for 
individual needs or the Social Committee, and the Committee 
for Education.
The various kibbutz offices are filled on a tempo­
rary, rotation basis, and it is important to note that
...those who happen to hold these offices do enjoy 
considerable power. Moreover... though the tenure 
of office is limited to 2 or 3 years, only a small 
number of chaverim possess the necessary skills 
required to cope with the complexities of such 
offices...so that in effect these offices rotate 
among a small core of 12 to 15 persons (Spiro?
1970 s 25)•
These individuals comprise the managerial stratum, 
or what might be called the "power elite," of the kibbutz. 
"Thus there emerges a group of members whose personal 
status is so high that their re-election to managerial posi­
tions is a matter of course, the benefit to the group in 
making best use of them being obvious to all" (Rosenfeld? 
1951:769).
The trend toward organic solidarity is consistent 
with the kibbutz commitment to modernity in its economic and 
technological organization. For example, it is evident that 
the rise of a managerial stratum has made for efficient 
operation of agricultural and industrial enterprises. 
Durkheimfs theory also isolates two serious developments in 
the kibbutz. One is that the increasing specialization of 
labor is creating a class of managers in the kibbutz, which 
seems to go against the principle of egalitarianism. Second 
is that the trend toward organic solidarity is sure to
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undermine the spirit of communality in the kibbutz. In 
Durkheim's scheme, the division of labor literally changes 
the ties that hold society together, so that we could expect 
the relationship of individual to individual and individual 
to society to reflect less and less the intense feeling of 
community found in the early days of settlement.
Thorstein Veblen shared Spencer's Idea that evolu­
tion was a process of selective adaptation to the environ­
ment. While greatly Influenced by Marx in other respects, 
Veblen rejected the notion that mankind was evolving toward 
some end. Rather, he interpreted evolution to be "a scheme 
of blindly cumulative causation, in which there is no 
trend, no final term, no consummation" (1919:^36).
Evolution involved above all the invention and
application of more and more sophisticated technology.
"The process of cumulative change that is to be accounted
for is the sequence of change in the methods of doing
things--the methods of dealing with the material means of 
10life."-' Thus, the adaptation of man to the environment is 
predicated upon what Veblen called the "state of the indus­
trial arts." The evolution of human societies must then be 
seen as "a process of natural selection of institutions" 
(Veblen; 193^*188). "Institutions are not only themselves 
the result of a selective and adaptive process which shapes 
the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and
30. From. L.E. Dobriansky, Veblenism; A New Critique 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957)• P« 159*
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aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of 
life and human, relations" (Veblen; 193^*188).
Crucial as technology was to his theory of social 
change, Veblen realized that its impact on society was not 
immediate and direct. A new technology does not automat­
ically bring forth new systems of laws, new moral attitudes, 
or new types of education. Rather, it challenges old 
institutions and evokes their resistance. "Institutions 
are products of the past process, are adapted to past cir­
cumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the 
requirements of the present" (Veblen; 193^sI9l)° .In the 
end, he believed, the new technology erodes the old order 
and reshapes institutions in line with its own needs.
Technology has played a central role in the problems 
and progress of the kibbutz movement. From- the early 1920s 
through the mid-19^0s the kibbutz agricultural economy 
expanded, primarily through increasing mechanization. The 
eventual breach with the ideal of farming was facilitated 
by the fact that farming itself had undergone this process 
of modernization. The new industrial technology enabled 
the kibbutz to provide meaningful work for the older members 
and challenging opportunities for the young, technically 
trained kibbutzniks.
There is one important point concerning industrial­
ization, technology, and hired labor not yet considered.
The movement has always experienced a manpower shortage and 
when industrialization expanded the kibbutz economy, more
63-
and more hired workers were needed. This was the source of 
much embarrassment to kibbutzniks, who attached a quasi­
religious significance to productive self-labor. Despite 
the embarrassment, the use of hired labor has now become 
institutionalized in the kibbutz. The case of hired labor 
is an excellent example of how economic considerations can 
take precedence over, and ultimately shape, the ideas of a 
people.
Thus, the economic development of the kibbutz, 
committed as it is to progress, growth, efficiency, produc­
tivity, and rationalization, is on a collison-course with 
one value to which the kibbutz must maintain its commitment, 
that of communality. This is perhaps one of the unantici­
pated consequences of increasing technology. Indeed, as 
Veblen suggested, technology erodes vested interests.
CHAPTER Y 
EQUALITY
Equality among members is generally recognized as 
one of the most important of the original kibbutz values 
(Infield: 19^6; Yissakhar: 19^9; Rosenfelds 1951? Aurbach: 
1953? Diamond: 1957? Vallier: 19^2$ Darin-Drabkin*. 19^3? 
Leon: 196 ?^ Kerem: 19^5; Golomb and Katz: 1970; Spiro: 1970; 
Azania: 1971; Ben David: 1971; Golan: 1971; Maron: 1971? 
Rosner: 1971; Blumberg: 1972; Yuchtman: 1972; and others).
To reiterate, there are two basic reasons for the 
value placed on equality in the early kibbutzim. It may 
first be explained as a reaction against the traditional 
family structure and status differentiation in both the 
shtetl and the larger European society at the turn of the 
20th century (Diamond: 1957; Spiro: 1970; and Maron: 1971). 
The intrinsic value of self-labor was stressed in the early 
kibbutzim as a means of destroying the gross social inequal­
ities of European society.
There is no class structure in Kiryet 
Yedidim, and there is no differential reward system 
for different kinds of labor based on some ranking 
technique. Some kinds of work...are valued more 
highly than others; but those who occupy the more 
highly valued jobs receive no greater reward than
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the others. The important psychological fact 
about the kibbutz culture is that everyone, regard­
less of work, is viewed as a worker, with the same 
privileges and responsibilities as anyone else 
(Spiro; 1970 s 23-2*0 .
Second, in the early days of the movement the prob­
lem of equality was relatively simplified by the austere
economic conditions facing the settlers• Survival imposed
on each member a uniform measure of maximum work and minimum 
consumption. In this respect, equality was the product of 
circumstances. It was, as Georges Friedmann observed, a 
time when all were equal in poverty.
Soon after the establishment of the first kibbutz, 
the principle of equality encountered a gigantic hurdle 
which Spiro (1970) called the "biological tragedy of women." 
From the beginning, the pioneers
...believed that the basis of inequality was an 
economic one--that the confinement of woman's work
to domestic duties and the rearing of children as a
full-time occupation made her dependent on her hus­
band and thereby produced a state of inequality 
within the family and the wider society as a whole 
(Yissakhar; 19^9:1).
Thus, "it was naively assumed that equality would follow 
from the conquest by the woman of the hardest physical work" 
(Leon; 196^:13^).
For a time the austere conditions necessitated that 
every able person lend a hand wherever needed. As the kib­
butz movement grew, and as the economy expanded, a certain 
amount of task differentiation did occur.
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Various agricultural and other areas were 
given the name of branches, and members began to 
specialize in one particular branch, such as the 
dairy, the orchards, field crops, or the carpentry 
shop. Every such branch was managed by a member 
with some experience and know-how who gathered a 
core of permanent workers around him (Weintraub?
1968;105).
As a result, women were gradually relieved of their 
duties in production areas of the kibbutz economy and shif­
ted to tertiary sectors, i.e., the vegetable garden, poul­
try, orchard and vineyard, and beekeeping. Ultimately, 
they came to be employed almost exclusively in the laundry, 
dining room, serving room, kitchen, and children1s houses 
(including teaching and nursing). Vallier reported that in 
Mayeem Kareen, "out of a total of 84- adult women, only one 
worked regularly in the field. A second woman assisted 
with the poultry, a third worked in the dairy" (1962:24-0). 
Other than that, the women were employed in the various 
"social services."
These occupations did not directly contribute to 
the economic welfare of the collective, and as such were not 
viewed as productive labor in the early days.
Many women who (had) been freed from the 
drudgery of housework paradoxically now (found) 
themselves still doing "housework" which (had) be­
come depersonalized, rationalized, and mechanized, 
and subdivided so that their tasks (were) less di­
verse than those of traditional housewives and far 
more repetitious, as they spend their time either 
by cooking all day or cleaning or sewing or baby 
tending ( Blumberg; 1972 :4-0) .
Thus, the role of women, like that of the elderly, tended to
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be devalued in the over-all economic operation of the 
collective:
...the early values of the youth movement (were) 
still operative to a considerable extent, so that 
women develop a certain feeling of inferiority as 
a result of working in these ’'menial” tasks. This 
feeling is exacerbated by the fact that the kibbutz 
values most highly those branches which bring in 
the greatest economic returns (Spiros 1970:226).
There are several possible explanations for the 
sexual division of labor in the kibbutz. One is that 
despite the ideological commitment of the founders, the 
kibbutz revolution has not been a total one.
At first, more than half the women worked 
in production. And yet very few men shared cooking 
and washing, and none sewing and child care. When 
more children were born, service work increased and 
women had to leave their work in production to at­
tend to those tasks, which men still did relatively 
rarely (Tiger and Shepher; 1975s263).
Also, the jobs of men and women did not become interchange­
able as kibbutz society mechanized. In a study of 3^,000 
kibbutzniks, Tiger and Shepher concluded that the answer is 
"that women have no personal or social inclination to yield 
certain service tasks to men, and men are reluctant to 
yield certain production tasks to women. Even when techno­
logical development obviates one of the basic reasons for 
sexual division of labor, the division remains" (1975*264).
A second possible explanation is based on the 
notion of retreatism and is associated with incomplete 
revolution. It suggests that when women lost hope of stay-
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ing in production areas, they retreated into service bran­
ches and to the seclusion and comfort of family relations.
Men show ambition in their desire to ad­
vance in political and economic affairs, while the 
ambition of women is felt to be expressed in family 
life, arts, belles-lettres, and raising the stan­
dards of life and personal comfort. 79f° of the 
respondents agreed that there were differences in 
the relative importance given by men, as compared 
to women, to work, family life and social activity. 
This difference is expressed in the primary con­
sideration given by women members to family life, 
all other affairs remaining secondary. Men 
usually placed these activities in a reverse order. 
These replies reflect the situation as it actually 
exists (Rosner? 19?ls62)«
Tiger and Shepher (1975) agreed that the main instigators 
of familization are women.
The division of labor may also be explained by the 
fact that the founders of the kibbutz movement were social­
ized into the culture of the shtetl. Is it possible that 
norms and values were internalized that precluded the imple­
mentation of a revolutionary system and the successful 
socialization of the second generation? If this is the 
case, that primary socialization processes are unalterable, 
why do we not see similar features in other areas of kibbutz 
life?
If we accept that the founders came from the 
shtetl as described by Zborowski and Herzog (1969), 
we must wonder what happened to the norms of indi­
vidualistic, achievement-oriented, competitive be­
havior central to that society. Instead of these, 
the kibbutz stressed cooperation, mutual help, and 
economic rewards independent of social role and work 
performance. Despite some small compromises, the 
system of equal economic rewards is intact and 
flourishing today. Why didn’t basic socialization
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remain unalterable here? The same question must he 
raised about the shtetl's plutocracy and piety, 
lastingly replaced on the kibbutz by direct democ­
racy and a secular or even antireligious ethos 
(Tiger and Shepher; 1975*264).
Another explanation is that men attempt to exclude 
women from the upper echelons of kibbutz management, i.e., 
the top managerial positions in the collective ordinarily 
rotate among 10-15 individuals, almost all men. It has 
been suggested that the bonds men form are unhelpful to the 
careers and ambitions of women (Tiger? 1969; 1975)* Does 
this idea have application to the kibbutz? Probably not, 
because the kibbutz was established in the search for social 
equality. However, it is true that the ideology of equality 
does not always correspond to the reality of life in the 
kibbutz. This has led to recurrent soul-searching and to 
the reinterpretation of the original values.
The problem of women is closely associated with the 
problem of aging in the kibbutz. The chalutzuit ideology 
stressed the value of labor and productivity, which were 
youthful values. The pioneer who reclaimed the marshes, 
cultivated the desert, and lived on the dangerous frontier 
was necessarily a young man, or a man in the prime of his 
life. Friedmann characterized the young kibbutznik as "a 
symbol of national renascence and of the personal redemption 
of the Jew by manual labor, and Zionist youth movements were 
(and to an extent still are) impregnated with these ideals" 
(1968:72)*
The glorification of hard, physical labor in the
70 o
early kibbutzim meant that aging was a physical and a moral 
decline as well. In a system that recognized worth and 
allocated prestige on the basis of the ability to be produc­
tive , aging was viewed as a gradual privation of grace.
The rise of a managerial stratum in the kibbutz 
provided a third front on which the notion of egalitarianism 
was attacked. The process of differentiation in the social 
structure of the kibbutz, which resulted in this managerial 
stratum, is related to the economic development of that 
society (Rosenfeld: 1951; Etzionii 1959? Shatil: 1970; and 
Spiros 1970).
In her article, "Social Stratification in a 'Class­
less1 Society," Eva Rosenfeld discussed social ranking in 
the kibbutz.
The concept of rank is...based on objec­
tively defined attributes of seniority and manager­
ial position in work or administration. The 
informal leaders of the kibbutz movement and within 
the collective are always members who belong to 
this upper stratum of old timers/managers. The 
rank and file (amlo) are composed of the middle 
stratum of "responsible workers" (both oldtimers 
and middlecomers) and of the lowest stratum of 
"pkaks" (1951:770).
Given the problem of women, the problem of the aged, 
and the rise of the managerial stratum, it is a foregone 
conclusion that there would have been a reinterpretation of 
the original definition of equality (Golomb and Katz: 1970; 
Ben David: 1971; Golan: 1971; Maron: 1971; and Rosner: 1971), 
in order to legitimize individual differences in consumption 
and production of goods and services, and to allow for a
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maximum of human freedom in general. The original defini­
tion of equality "emphasized the need to ignore even the 
differences in the physical capacities of the sexes— women 
were encouraged to take up hard physical activities, such 
as work in building construction and roadmaking" (Rosner; 
1971:57)* With regard to justifying a change, Ben David 
observed that "an equality is needed which relates to the 
differences existing between the members due to their very 
natures and needs" (1971:81). To this point, Yona Golan 
flatly stated that "our former definition of equality of 
the sexes has been exchanged for the concept that both sexes 
are equal in value" (1971:16^).
The notion of equality has therefore been "crea­
tively modified," in the words of Golomb and Katz (1970), 
from the arithmetic or mechanical equality among members 
that characterized the early kibbutzim, to a "relative” 
equality. The position now taken, according to Stanley 
Maron, is that "equality in status is unnatural, however 
desirable. Some individuals are inevitably more respected 
than others, some are more loved than others, some are 
better leaders. These status differences cannot be entirely 
eliminated" (1971:19-20). Thus, the kibbutz in no way now 
stands opposed to inequalities in status arising out of real 
or natural differences. It does, however, rigidly oppose 
differences in status as the result of material conditions 
and has effectively removed * monetary and/or materialistic 
rewards as a means of achieving status. The kibbutz maxim
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of "from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need," which at one time was interpreted to mean 
equal effort and minimum consumption, now is interpreted to 
recognize inherent differences in ability, as well as in 
need.
Maron contended that "to subordinate the individual 
member, his needs and his growth as a human being, to the 
unnecessary demands of a rigid collective ideal is to re­
duce him to an instrumental value, i.e., to a means instead 
of an end” (1971:18). He drew the following analogy to 
emphasize the points
When it comes to clothing, though, they find that 
they cannot give everyone the same size. Despite 
all the best will in the world to build social 
equality, the fact remains that the human body 
grows into different shapes and sizes and everybody 
needs to be fitted for their clothing individually. 
We see this clearly because it has to do with the 
body and is external. It is really no different, 
though with what is inside the body. The individual 
personality has its own individual needs and tastes, 
and a fixed measure of food, education, or anything 
else cannot be better than giving a fixed size in 
clothing.
The true equality of all men lies in their 
intrinsic value as human beings (1971:15-16).
As the kibbutz movement developed, it became ap­
parent that a broader definition of equality, and through 
this a broader definition of productive self-labor as well, 
was necessary. This broader definition was accomplished by 
interpreting the original meaning of equality as inconsis­
tent with the goal of human freedom, a larger objective of 
the kibbutz movement (Leon: 196 ;^ Kerem: 1965? Golomb and
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Katz: 1970; Azania: 1971; Rosner: 1971; and Shenker: 1971). 
"In order to attain (human freedom) we have taken five 
secondary values: work; mutual faith; direct democracy and 
participation; solidarity; equality; all of which serve 
the end of human freedom" (Shenker; 1971:21-22). Azania 
elaborated on this point, suggesting that there might be a 
contradiction or conflict between equality and human freedom:
The absolute communal control over both the means 
of production and man's ability to work creates an 
internal conflict within socialism. It seems that 
the socialist community cannot achieve all its aims 
without infringing upon the individual's freedom. 
How can the individual's liberty be assured when 
the community holds full control over his ability 
to work? The more equality is assured (through the 
community controlling work and its sources), the 
more will the infringement of liberty become neces­
sary. This, of necessity, creates a feeling of 
oppression.
The socialist society to which the kibbutz 
aspires will be built on two fundamental elements: 
control of the economy by the community, and the 
maintenance of human freedom (1971:9).
In this respect, the kibbutz has gotten away from
the definition of equality that reflects the socio-historical
experience of the shtetl, and is reminiscent of Engel's
strictly socialist conception of equality: "The real content
of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for
the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which
11goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity."
Since the traditional economic determinants are not present 
in the kibbutz, it is accurate to say that while the kibbutz
31. From Maron; 1971:19.
is indeed a differentiated society, It does not have the 
traditional class structure (Rosenfeld: 1951)°
In the implementation of the concept of 
equality in the broader sense, the kibbutz, despite 
its drawbacks, has reached a level unmatched by any 
modern society. In the long run, no members of the 
kibbutz benefit economically from the superior 
social or managerial position. The kibbutz ulti­
mately provides every member with similar housing, 
similar furnishings, and similar opportunities for 
recreation. It grants all members equal education 
for their children, similar food, similar clothing, 
complete medical care, equal economic security, and 
similar opportunity for creative self-expression. 
Each and every member is entitled to the full mea­
sure of all these benefits no matter what his job 
in the kibbutz, how long he has been in the kibbutz, 
what his previous background, or what his technical 
skill (Kerem; 1965:55)*
Thus, using the criteria established by the kibbutz, the 
existence of a managerial stratum is not inconsistent with 
the broader definition of equality.
The redefinition of the principle of equality neces­
sarily brought a redefinition of productive self-labor. 
Whereas hard, physical labor was glorified in the early days 
of the movement, it is now recognized that members can con­
tribute only "according to ability," and this inevitably
12results in differences in output. To restate Yona Golan*s 
earlier comment: "Our former definition of equality of the
32. It should be kept in mind that the reinterpre­
tation of the principle of equality, and other original prin­
ciples as well, has basically been accomplished by second 
generation and third generation kibbutzniks. The fact that 
this reinterpretation has come to be spelled out in pragmatic 
terms should not be surprising--the idealism of the founders 
is not easily passed on to their children. This would ex­
plain the pragmatic nature of ideological elaboration.
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sexes has been exchanged for the concept that both sexes 
are equal in value” (I971sl6^). This is a very important 
point, embracing the idea that true equality is in the 
recognition of all kibbutzniks as human beings, and not in 
the maintenance of artifical standards of production.
The kibbutzim have moved a long way in 
recognizing that individual differences are a basic 
fact of life and, in one sense, their optimization 
is the goal of a utopian community. What they at­
tempt to maintain is the essential equality of 
opportunity for the development of different human 
potentials (Golomb and Katz? 1970:^8).33
According to the reformed ideological position, the 
employment of women in tertiary sectors of the kibbutz 
economy is now considered to be on a par with employment in 
all other sectors of the economy, as each task is regarded 
as socially necessary. This has not changed the fact that 
women, as compared with men in the kibbutz, still tend to 
find their jobs less satisfying and less productive. Thus, 
the ideological elaboration of the value of equality has, 
in effect, justified the plight of women in the kibbutz, 
and there has been little done to remedy the causes of their 
dissatisfaction and frustration within the work role itself. 
The fact that women were more likely than men to be dissat-
33- As an example, Golomb and Katz point to the 
Kibbutz Artzi, with 7k collectives and 17, ^ kL members 
(1968), where 3.6 per cent of the people are granted release 
time from regular work assignments in order to pursue artis­
tic interests. Of the 629 total there are 116 sculptors and 
painters, 50 authors, 71 actors and other personnel in 
drama, 68 musicians and composers, 75 dancers, 132 photo­
graphers, and 117 in other areas.
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isfied with the collective experience had serious repercus­
sions for the kibbutz, bringing into question the whole 
notion of an egalitarian society. “Almost every couple who 
has left the kibbutz has done so because of the unhappiness 
of the woman; and there seem to be a number of women who 
would like to leave but remain because of their husbands" 
(Spiro; 1970:223).
As a function of the collective ownership of the 
means of economic production, the absence of a system of 
differential rewards, and equal access to political power, 
the kibbutz does not have discernible stratified groups.
This goes against the classic statement of the functional­
ist view of stratification by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert 
Moore. In their article, "Some Principles of Stratification," 
they stated that "the main functional necessity explaining 
the universal presence of stratification is precisely the 
requirement faced by any society of placing and motivating 
individuals in the social structure" (19^5*2^2). In 
addition, a society places and motivates individuals by the 
differential distribution of rewards, of which there are 
three kinds. There are things which contribute to: (1) 
sustenance and comfort; (2) humor and diversion; and (3) 
self-respect and ego-expansion. All three rewards are pre­
sent, in some degree, in each position in society (Davis 
and Moore: 19^5)*
If the rights and prerequisites of different 
positions in a society must be unequal, then the 
society must be stratified, because that is precisely
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what stratification means. Social inequality is 
thus an unconsciously evolved device hy which 
societies insure that the most important positions 
are conscientiously filled by the most qualified 
personso Hence, every society, no matter how sim­
ple or complex, must differentiate persons in terms 
of both prestige and esteem, and must therefore 
possess a certain amount of institutionalized in­
equality (Davis and Moore? 19^\5:2^3)*
Eva Rosenfeld suggested that the kibbutz was an 
exception to the Davis and Moore argument vis-a-vis the 
distribution of rewards by society:
They claim...that "In any social system all three 
kinds of rewards must be dispensed differentially 
according to position." The stratification system 
in the kibbutz certainly supports the statement 
concerning the existence of special rewards, but it 
shows also that it is not necessary for any system 
to dispense all three kinds of rewards. Special 
sustenance and comfort are not associated with high 
prestige positions; neither is there any indication 
that, all other forces remaining equal, future 
developments will necessarily lead to preferential 
treatment of the managerial stratum with regard to 
the standard of living. To the contrary, a pressure 
for higher material rewards comes from the rank and 
file who are underprivileged in "humor and diver­
sion" as well as in "self-respect and ego-expansion." 
The former type of rewards is sought by them as a 
compensation for the lack of the latter two 
(1951:771).
The most important fact determining a kibbutznik's 
position is work. From Parsons' (19^ +0) point of view, 
stratification was a matter of "moral evaluation." Because 
all societies have systems of values, Parsons suggested 
that a person's relative standing in the society reflected 
the extent to which his or her characteristics and achieve­
ments correspond to those values. For example, if a society 
placed a special value on physical strength, the stronger
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members will be accorded higher prestige than weaker members. 
In a society like the United States, where economic achieve­
ment is very important, persons with wealth are accorded 
high status.
In the original kibbutz ideology, work v/as an end in 
itself. However, once the economic system became differen­
tiated, specialized expertise became a new basis for 
evaluation.
When everyone did similar and simple work, 
differences in performance were not always striking. 
As both agricultural and industrial production be­
came more technologically sophisticated, the elab­
oration of work branches made specialization more 
pronounced, and differences in professional know­
ledge appeared among workers. Professional know­
ledge was not always equivalent to effort and 
devotion. Now a more intelligent person might 
achieve a higher professional level-with less effort 
than relatively untalented co-members. In some 
cases, the new criterion replaced the old one 
(Tiger and Shepher; 1975:^8).
Especially after the establishment of the State in 
19^8, the country's economic development was such that 
neither effort nor professional knowledge was sufficient for 
the survival of an agricultural branch; there had to be a 
profit. The kibbutz grew faster economically than it did 
in manpower; the branches that required high manpower but 
were not profitable were gradually abandoned. Economic suc­
cess became the criterion for evaluating work branches, and 
a branch's status partly determined the personal status of 
its workers.
The primary source of prestige is that of membership
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in the kibbutz, and it influences behavior principally when 
members meet nonmembers, such as candidates and temporary 
workers. Another source of prestige, enjoyed by the old- 
timers, reflects their past achievements and puts them 
above the possible daily criticism of activities. There is 
also prestige for those members actually born in the col­
lective, and for kibbutzniks who have held a number of 
important posts.
All of these factors carry some weight in deter­
mining status, but what still counts first and foremost is 
not who one is but rather what one does. In short, since 
economic rewards and very great payoffs through power and 
authority do not exist, informal social rewards are tremen­
dously important. Personal status is based chiefly on the 
esteem in which one is held as a worker. Other factors in 
status are social relations, adherence to the norms of col­
lective consumption, participation in the political system, 
behavior as spouse and parent, and performance in the cul­
tural areas. An Ideal kibbutz member would be described as 
a good and devoted worker--energetic, enthusiastic, and 
successful--preferably in a prosperous work branch.
It must be stressed, however, that differences in 
personal status do not constitute formal stratification.
Only if persons with higher status are concentrated and 
organized in a distinguishable group, and transmit their 
status to their offspring, does stratification exist. There 
is no current or specific research on stratification in the
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kibbutz, but in the early 1950s a group of American social 
scientists studied this question.- Their results were diver­
gent; Eva Rosenfeld's claim of a class structure in one 
kibbutz was completely refuted by Y.G. Talmon (1956) and 
Shepher (1952). Later research findings touching the same 
issue supported Talmon1s findings and interpretations 
(Leshem and Cohen: 1968 and Shepher: 197^)•
Talmon (1956) and Shepher (197^) explained the 
mechanisms that prevent the emergence of formal stratified 
groups in the kibbutz. First, the integration of subgroups 
based on age, seniority, and national origin is stronger 
than the integration of main officeholders. Second, re­
cruitment to the managerial elite is by rotation, so that 
membership is temporary. Not only do important office­
holders have no economic advantages, but the social disad­
vantages of exposure to constant criticism, and possible 
jeopardy of personal and family contacts because of work 
overload, discourage people from seeking elite positions.
In fact, a person elected to such a position usually demands 
the right to stand down after two to three years. Elite 
positions are therefore constantly open to newcomers.
Third, political and organizational activity out­
side the kibbutz offers an outlet for people who have served 
within it. The influence of outside jobs, I.e., those 
serving the State, on one's internal status is often cor­
rosive. This also prevents the crystallization of a closed 
and solidary elite group.
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Two basic ways of forming a stable class are by 
strategic placement of children and by endogamous marriage 
within the class group. Talmon (1972) has dealt with the 
first strategy and Talmon (196 )^ and Shepher (1971) with the 
second. Status by placement is largely prevented by the 
egalitarian and collective system of education. "Inter­
marriage between second-generation adults is relatively rare 
and limited to couples where there is an age difference of 
at least four years. The cohesion of age groups counteracts 
the formation of the extended family, which itself is under 
severe social control" (Tiger and Shepher; 1975*59)*
The egalitarian system of economic reward success­
fully prevents the development of classes in the Weberian 
sense. Of course, in the Marxist sense, this is prevented 
a priori by the complete socialization of production. The 
relative absence of prestige differences also prevents the 
formation of (Weberian) status groups. The paradoxically 
mixed rewards of occupying elite political positions inhibit 
striving for such positions and, by definition, the forma­
tion of groups aspiring to power (which would typically 
become formal political parties). Thus, there is no con­
vergence of the various rewards which elsewhere greatly 
contribute to stratification.
CHAPTER VI 
COMMUNAL LIVING
The communal nature of the kibbutz has changed over 
the decades of development and perhaps the most important 
elements in this change can be found in the system of 
collective consumption, In the institution of collective 
education and child rearing, and in the pioneering spirit 
of the movement.
Focusing to this point on changes in the original 
values of farming as a way of life, asceticism, simplicity, 
labor, and equality, we have sought to understand, the 
relationship between the evolving society and the evolving 
ideology of the kibbutz movement. In the middle stands the 
kibbutznik who, through the process of ideological elabora­
tion, attempts to maintain a sense of consistency between 
the ideology and the real kibbutz world, while at the same 
time attempting to maintain the integrity and internal 
consistency of the ideology itself.
In his Paths in Utopia (19^9)i Martin Buber charac­
terized the kibbutz as an "experiment that did not fail," 
principally because it committed itself to broad social and 
national goals, thus avoiding the isolation and progressive
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atrophy of other utopian experiments. Indeed, at least part 
of the success of the kibbutz movement has been, and contin­
ues to be, its ability to compete economically with the 
larger (capitalist) Israeli society. Thus, the kibbutz has, 
out of necessity, committed Itself to expansion, productiv­
ity, and modernization.
Pressure for "progress"--in the secular and 
even materialistic sense of dynamic social and 
economic development--!ollows then partly from the 
relation of the kibbutz to the broader society and 
its goals. It is reinforced by pressure within the 
kibbutz for a higher standard of living and the 
provision of facilities for a fuller life and the 
personal fulfillment of its members (Cohen; 1966:5)*
It is suggested here that the commitment of the kib­
butz movement to economic progress has indeed secured its 
physical survival, but at the price of undercutting the 
basic gemeinschaftliche character of the kibbutz. In other 
words, the economic development of society altered not only 
the strictly economic relations within that society but 
impacted on social relations as well. It is precisely this 
occurrence which has brought about the comment that the 
spirit of "kibbutzness" has irreparably changed from the 
early days of settlement. The process of ideological elab­
oration may be understood in this context, as an attempt to 
explain away, or at least to minimize, any erosion in the 
value of communality and to render compatible the commit­
ments of the kibbutz to both economic progress and communal 
life. This is indeed difficult to do.
In the early days of settlement, the kibbutz was an
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agrarian movement. Industry, before the mid-1930s, was 
generally confined to small shops which supplied parts and. 
equipment to the agricultural sector. It was an austere, 
uncertain, yet exciting and challenging time for kibbutzniks. 
The agricultural development of the movement was in its 
adolescence, the industrial development in its infancy.
As the kibbutz movement developed, it became quite 
clear that the original conception of farming as a way of 
life was inconsistent with the larger kibbutz commitment to 
progress--progress both of the kibbutz itself and of the 
Jewish nation. In order to insure that progress, the basic 
ideological tenet of farming as a way of life was then 
simply and pragmatically reinterpreted to justify the indus­
trialization of the kibbutz movement.
A similar ideological conflict developed vis-a-vis 
collective consumption. In the early days, there was a 
uniform and modest consumption of goods and services. On 
the one hand, there was a commitment on the part of those 
who fled the shtetls of Eastern Europe to avoid the bour­
geois materialism of their parents and the larger European 
society. On the other hand, asceticism was "also a response 
to the early material conditions of the kibbutz wherein 
money was scarce, productive potential low, and consumer 
goods difficult to obtain" (Diamond; 1957:93).
During the period of total collectivity, known as 
Commune A, the kibbutznik owned only a toothbrush and a 
pair of slippers. Clothes were owned in common and were
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3^redistributed after being cleaned. This system continued 
until about the mid-1930s when, as the kibbutz movement 
prospered, the austerity of consumption was gradually 
changed.
The fundamental ideological- problem was that, begin­
ning in the mid-1930s and accelerating steadily after the 
creation of the State, the kibbutz was able to increase the 
level of consumption of goods and services and also make 
accommodations to individual needs and tastes. However, 
this represented a breach of original values that stressed 
that consumption should be on a strict collective basis and 
should be maintained at an ascetic and simple level.
There are two important factors in the transition 
of collective consumption. First, when the kibbutz economy 
was able to support a more modern style of life, the system 
of collective consumption changed accordingly. Specifical­
ly, the trend toward individuation in consumption ran 
counter to the original concept of collective consumption, 
but not at all (so the kibbutz argument goes) inconsistent 
with a modern, affluent society to which progress in the 
kibbutz was also committed.Thus, ideological elaboration
3^. Rosner summed this up cjuite well: "In regard 
to consumption, the kibbutz in its early days manifested 
marked features of "secular asceticism," the importance of 
consumption was largely disregarded and its level held to a 
minimum" . (1971s99)•
35* We previously discussed that women were not as 
likely to be rewarded in terms of either humor and diversion 
or self-esteem and ego-expansion, and were therefore much 
more concerned with increased sustenance and comfort. It is 
primarily the women who have been responsible for the grow­
ing consumer orientation in the kibbutz.
had to reconcile the impact of economic development on the 
value of collective consumption.
Friedmann summed up the thoughts of critics and some 
kibbutzniks alike when he stated that "concessions made to 
individual consumption, limited though they may be, con­
stitute a serious breach in the collectivist ideology of 
the communities" (1968:77)* He further stated that "the 
kibbutz is no longer a place where "all are equal in poverty, 
but it cannot become a place where "all are equal in af­
fluence" without denying its principles" (1968:7^)« In 
this respect, ideological elaboration has basically been an 
attempt to show that the kibbutz can indeed become affluent 
and provide for human freedom, of which individualized con­
sumption is a part, without compromising the ideals of 
equality and communality.
Second, the whole notion of communality took on a 
different meaning. The sturm und drang of the early kib­
butzim weakened, I believe, so that communality came to be 
viewed more and more in terms of a general sharing, mutual 
responsibility, and cooperation.
The kibbutznik continues to observe the 
outward forms of what has become established kib­
butz virtue, but the spirit underlying it all, 
often seems to have flagged. He continues to work 
hard, and to observe a certain austerity in his 
personal way of life; and yet a certain momentum, 
tied up with his own personal history, with the 
history of the kibbutz and with the development of 
the new Jewish national community, a momentum which 
had once been the very condition of his hard work, 
seems to have been lost (Sanders; 1965:^8).
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In a 1968 study, Arian auggested that the notion of 
the "decline of ideology" is subject to three possible 
interpretations, i.e., changes in the content, intensity, 
and general acceptance of the ideology*
The "decline" might refer to a change in 
the systematic relations among the elements of the 
ideology; that is, the content of the ideology 
formed an integrated whole in the past but has 
"disintegrated" in the present* Alternatively, we 
might mean by the decline that the intensity with 
which the ideology was once held has diminished 
over time--that more of the elements of the ideol­
ogy were accepted in the past than in the present 
or that they were more firmly believed then* We 
might mean by the concept that more people accepted 
the ideology In the past than in the present 
(Arian; 1968s120)„
He found evidence that the "decline of ideology" refers to 
a decline in the intensity of belief but not to a disinte­
gration of the content of the ideology.
What I have called the kibbutz ideology ap­
pears to retain the properties which justify our 
including it under the definition of ideology in 
the ideological present and in the ideological 
past. Fewer people unanimously identify with the 
ideology among the public servants interviewed, 
but the structure of the ideology remains relative­
ly stable (Arian; 1968:126).
Before discussing how the ideal of communality has 
evolved, and more importantly, how this change was explained 
and justified, it would be appropriate to look at communal 
life in the early days of the movement. Gerson explained 
that during this period group activity was reified:
That was the period when every bit of strength was 
needed to build and protect the farm economy. The
difficult struggle for existence and the desire to 
prove that the new collective way of life could 
maintain itself led to the demand that every member 
grant absolute priority to the kibbutz's interest, 
even above his concern for his own. family. At that 
time it was even customary for a couple not to ap­
pear together publicly, with man and wife going 
separately to meals and to kibbutz meetings. It was 
not surprising that at the time wedding ceremonies 
were entirely negated (1971 s 15-2) •
Invariably, the first permanent building erected in 
the kibbutz was the dining hall. Located in the center of 
the community, the dining hall dominated much more than 
just the physical plant of the early kibbutz. In those 
days, many kibbutzim were small in size, with populations 
of under one hundred members. The community was very much 
a Gemeinschaft and the dining hall was the place where these 
close personal relationships were nurtured. Events were 
taking place there every night--community meetings, special 
social and cultural events, or the typical talking and 
dreaming with comrades and dancing the hora into the night. 
The dining hall represented the coming together of many 
different people to form an organic whole. It is difficult 
to underestimate the special significance these events held 
for the early kibbutzniks, or the symbolic significance of 
the dining hall at that time.
The difficult years of physical survival are now 
past and "there is more freedom to relax informal pressures 
toward unity on all fronts. As a result, the kibbutzim are
36. It is obvious that the family was purposefully 
deemphasized at this time.
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less rigid about ideological standards of communal living; 
they are more discriminating in their beliefs about doing 
things together and more tolerant of individual deviation” 
(Golomb and Katz; 1970:51)* Additionally, "there has been 
a gradual trend toward allowing individual members to own 
more personal possessions--fumiture, children’s toys, 
records, etc" (Weingarten; 1952:21), This trend has been 
defended by Melford Spiro:
There are at least four reasons why this increase 
in private property has created little frictions 
(1) Those who have acquired personal effects do 
not flaunt them--there is no conspicuous consump­
tion. Moreover, they are quite willing to share 
them when asked. (2) "Things" still have no effect 
on one's standing in the community, the contribu­
tion one makes to the group being far more impor­
tant, so that a member's possessions have no import 
on his work pattern. (3) The increase in private 
property is now almost incorporated into the ideol­
ogy. Not only are some things seen as a legitimate 
extension of "to each according to his needs"--a 
musician's tape recorder, for example--but it is 
now accepted that the public and private sectors of 
life can grow and expand together. Few would deny 
the dangers involved in this philosophy, but the 
idea that self-development must counterpoint group- 
development has taken root in (what seems to be) an 
irreversible manner. (^ ) It is a source of kibbutz 
pride that they have been able to mainain--at least 
as much as anyone in Israel "maintains"--a standard 
of living which allows for these goods (1970:261-262).
In fact, Spiro viewed the whole trend toward material pro­
gress as quite possibly having a positive impact on the 
gemeinschaftliche character of the kibbutz:
The absence of an abundant and diversified diet, 
the overcrowded and noisy dining room, the din and 
dinginess of the shower rooms, the long distance to 
overused and frequently inefficient toilets-- 
malodorous in summer and muddy in winter--all take
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heavy psychological tolls. Add to these the almost 
constant pressure of an acute labor shortage, and 
the inevitable strains induced by the consequent 
long work week and not infrequent labor drafts, and 
it may not be remiss to suggest that though material 
progress may not be a necessary condition for 
greater brotherhood in the kibbutz, it would surely 
serve to alleviate many of the tensions which cur­
rently stand in its way (1970t 2 ^ 5 -2A6).
The ideological justification of individualized con­
sumption, and the consequent ownership of some personal 
items, has been in line with the reinterpretation of equal­
ity in the kibbutz. The kibbutz maxim of "from each accor­
ding to his ability, to each according to his need," which 
at one time was interpreted to mean equal effort and 
minimum consumption, is now viewed as recognizing inherent 
differences in ability, as well as in need. Once inherent 
inequalities in financial, administrative, or general labor 
abilities were recognized in kibbutz ideology, and the 
concept of relative equality applied in this area, it was 
little time before the concept was applied in the area of 
consumption also. The change in the ideal of equality, as 
it related to production, paved the way for change in equal­
ity as it related to consumption. Both trends were reinter­
preted in the context of, and legitimized by, the basic 
kibbutz maxim.
There is little doubt that the trend toward individ­
ualized consumption, and the ownership of personal items, 
marked the decline of the central role played by the dining 
hall. Gradually, the individual apartment, and the family 
life centered around it, came to be more and more important
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in the lives of the kibbutzniks. However, the process of 
ideological elaboration was not intended to come to grips 
with the relationship between the increase in individualized 
consumption and the consequent increase in individual (as 
opposed to strictly collective) lives and lifestyles, and 
the significance this has for the kibbutz as a GemeinSchaft. 
Rather, the focus is on how changes in the system of col­
lective consumption have enabled the kibbutz to provide for 
more human freedom than at any other time in its history, a 
much more positive and constructive view*
On this point, Stern concluded that "the standard of 
living is primarily a matter of individual taste and not of 
inequality. Each member is entitled to a radio, an electric 
fan, a small refrigerator, perhaps even to a television set 
when available as long as it does not interfere with the 
growth and development of the kibbutz" (1965:139)® The 
solutions reached in the areas of consumption "usually per­
mitted a minimum gratification of individual desires, while 
at the same time strictly preserving the egalitarian pattern" 
(Weintraub; 1969:110).
Dan Leon summed up the kibbutz thinking on this 
matter, as well as some of the problems facing the kibbutz, 
stating "There is no evidence that collective consumption, 
as such, cannot cater for individual tastes or that freedom 
of choice is incompatible with equality. But as the kibbutz 
is able to provide more for its members, it must prove this 
not only objectively, but also subjectively, and the two do
not always go hand in hand" (196?*.82-83)«
Throughout the history of the kibbutz movement, 
members have been flexible and willing to modify the ways 
in which non-essential or marginal values have been put into 
practice. But there has also been the requirement that they 
should remain steadfast in their commitment to essential 
values. When critics have been quick to suggest that 
"kibbutzness" has diminished substantially, the reply has 
been that the movement is "essentially" the same as in the 
early days. While some aspects of the ideal of communality 
have indeed changed, other aspects have not, i.e., the sys­
tem of mutual responsibility. In the process of ideological 
elaboration this unique system of social security is regarded 
as fundamental to the communal way of life in the kibbutz, 
and is pointed to as an example of the amazing continuity 
of the movement over the years.
Cartwright and Zander (i960) stated that there are 
two sources of individual attraction to the group, both of 
which are present in the kibbutz: (1) the group itself is 
the object of need, and (2) being in the group is a means 
for satisfying needs which transcend the group itself. On 
the first point, the kibbutz movement attaches great signif­
icance to communal production and to the system of mutual 
responsibility, both of which tend to affirm the validity 
and primacy of the group experience. On the second point, 
kibbutz members believe that the movement is a prime factor 
in the success of Zionism in Palestine, and in the repudia-
tion of the historical image of the Jew.
As a means of understanding the ideal of mutual 
responsibility, the kibbutz way of life may be contrasted 
with that of the larger (capitalist) Israeli society. In 
the city, the family is the focal point of life. A division 
of labor usually exists wherein the man provides economic 
support and some degree of protection, and the woman main­
tains the household, bears, and cares for the children.
The family is the source of sustenance and security for its 
members. In the city, an individual assumes various iden­
tities depending on the nature of his activities. In our 
society, for example, it is not uncommon for a man to be a 
teacher, an officer in the Army Reserves, and a member of 
the Rotary Club. Each role is acted out in a different 
social context, and his social position is the result of 
several factors.
In the early days of the kibbutz, the group formed 
the framework for the member's entire existence. As long 
as he was a member of the collective, the kibbutznik had 
little identity apart from the group experience, for he was 
judged entirely on how he contributed to the attainment of 
group goals.
The founders saw a community in which people 
worked together in attaining their own goals as a 
means for achieving what Martin Buber called the 
I-Thou relationship, rather than the I-it relation­
ship, the former being expressive and cooperative, 
the latter exploitative. Soloman Asch has referred 
to the relationship of people interacting in this 
fashion as shared psychological fields (Golomb and 
Katz; 1970:Al).
Unlike an organizational or group membership in the 
city, in the kibbutz one could never put aside the group 
experience. It Is not an aspect of his life but his entire 
life. It reached into and controlled every aspect of life, 
and it is this totality of the group experience that some­
times drove members from the kibbutz.
The early form of this belief in collective 
living emphasized the oneness of the individual and 
the community. All members were supposed to be 
completely identified with the collectivity. Dif­
ferentiation of individuals in property, in dress, 
and in roles was to be avoided as expressions of 
egocentric!ty. And this lack of differentiation, 
as Durkheim maintained, did produce a common col­
lective conscience. To be part of a community and 
to behave as one of its similarly acting members 
was, and to some extent remains, a moral value 
(Golomb and Katz; 1970:^1-^2).
The traditional functions of the family do not exist 
in the kibbutz, they continue to be supplanted by the pri­
macy of the group (Spiro: 195*0- Thus, one's commitment is 
not ultimately to the family but to the group. The group 
assures the relative equality and social security of its 
members. The individual member improves his life-situation 
as a result of the general improvements of the community, 
and the community needs the contentment of the individual 
members for its own stability. In this system of mutual 
responsibility, the individual has a vested interest in the 
progress of the kibbutz as a whole and not his family in 
particular.
The difference between the kibbutz and town 
as far as individual freedom is concerned can be
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defined as follows: in town the individual depends 
on society for essentials, but this dependence is 
as a rule disguised, and he is free in small things,, 
In the kibbutz, on the other hand, the individual 
is free in essential points— his living and that of 
his family, the future of his children-~but in small 
things he is more dependent on the community (Darin- 
Drabkin; 1963:176).
In addition, the group insures the complete social security 
of every member, regardless of his relative value to the 
kibbutz. For example, as long as there is food in the com­
munity, everyone is given a share "according to need."
Cooperation, rather than competition, is the norm 
of kibbutz life. Competition exists only insofar as various 
productive sectors of the economy are concerned, and only 
then in terms of which sector contributes most to the eco­
nomic objectives of the community. Competition at the 
individual level is considered detrimental to the communality 
of the kibbutz; egoism and selfishness are regarded with 
extreme displeasure. "It is probable that the lack of 
competitive individualism creates the feeling that one is 
always a member of the 'in group'" (Crown; 1965:^32).
Though material incentives are collective 
and not personal, they undoubtedly have great impor­
tance in determining the kibbutz member's attitudes 
to work. He knows that the standard of living and 
the social security of him and his family depend 
upon his efforts--though not only his efforts.
Along with others, he feels the obligation not only 
to pay his passage, so to speak, but also to raise 
his own standards through his contributions to the 
general effort (Leon; 196^:7^)-
With his entire future laid out before him, each 
member can easily identify with the means and ends of the
kibbutz. He can see, due to the small size of the average 
collective and the visibility of its members, how his pro­
ductivity fits into the over-all economic scheme and what 
the consequences are if he fails to do his job. He is 
aware that in the system of mutual responsibility, each mem­
ber is dependent on every other member, and as long as he 
works hard and contributes to the group, the group, in turn, 
will take care of him. The democratic structure of the 
kibbutz often results in public referendums at community 
meetings and the individual not only sees the opinions of 
others affecting change, but he also knows that at any given 
time his personal opinion will be listened to and valued.
The children of every member, regardless of his standing in 
the kibbutz, are eligible to reap the benefits of the col­
lective educational system. The security of the individual 
is also guaranteed. If he is physically disabled he may 
have better accommodations and be eating better food than 
the General Secretary of the collective, for an indefinite 
period of time and without loss of social security for his 
family.
Thus, ideological elaboration in the kibbutz indi­
cates that in every aspect of collective life the concepts 
of equality and communality are operationalized so that 
every member feels that the kibbutz is more than just a 
place to live. In short, it is maintained that the notion 
of a Gemeinschaft continues to be a living, vibrant reality. 
However, the trend toward individuation must undercut the
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feeling of communality, for that is what individuation means. 
Group involvement is no longer viewed as an intensely emo­
tional experience; the spirit of the founders has been 
replaced by the pragmatism of the succeeding generations.
The decision to live in the kibbutz Is therefore based more 
and more on practical considerations, i.e., the system of 
mutual responsibility. But for the founding fathers, com- 
munality was based on the subjective aspects relating to 
interaction, rather than on the objective merits of the 
system.
The effectiveness of the early kibbutzim In develop­
ing an attitude of community is perhaps best exemplified by 
the system of education and child rearing. Recently, 
however, this system has also been the source of consider­
able ideological tension in some kibbutzim. From the time 
the child is born the community plays a central role in the 
process of socialization. After the weaning period the 
child is placed in one of the children's houses, in a group 
of six or seven other boys and girls with whom he will live 
until he enters high school. He typically visits his 
parents in their quarters for about 2 to 3 hours daily (and 
for longer periods on weekends), after which he returns to 
the children's house to sleep. At high school age his group 
merges with three or four others. Every aspect of life is 
in the group context--eating, sleeping, playing, and learning. 
Most importantly, for the kibbutz, the children are instilled 
with the virtues of the collective way of life. It is a
. major purpose of the educational system that the children 
should grow up with the idea that collective living is the 
only life. Thus, it is maintained by kibbutzniks that the 
feeling of community is still strong in the collective, 
remaining essentially unchanged In this respect from the 
early days of settlement. As an example of the high degree 
of group cohesion, kibbutzniks point with pride to the fact 
that
...the great majority of the kibbutz second genera­
tion, after their contacts with the outside world 
through their service In the armed forces, return 
to the kibbutz--either to their own community or to 
the kibbutz of the spouse. The low attrition rate 
is all the more remarkable in view of the greater 
affluence and the greater variety of stimulation 
provided by the urban environment (Golomb and Katz; 
197088) .
Women, in general, have been at the forefront of 
demands for a more individualized lifestyle. This has pri­
marily focused on the consumption of goods but, as the kib­
butz has prospered economically, women have been pressing 
for a more traditional family life. Specifically, many 
kibbutz women have found parting with their children at 
night very difficult to accept. Of course, the children's 
houses are an integral part of the kibbutz system of child 
rearing and educations permitting children to sleep in the 
parent's apartment would reduce the educational system to 
little more than a day school not unlike schools in other 
towns in Israel. Also, it would reduce the central role 
played by the community itself in the rearing of its
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children, and generally weaken the ties binding individuals 
and families to the collective.
While many critics and some kibbutzniks alike have 
viewed this trend as further undermining communality in the 
kibbutz, ideologists have pointed out that the movement has 
always been structurally diverse. Specifically, more than 
20 collectives have always provided for children sleeping 
with parents, never causing a furor over their integrity as 
kibbutzim. The justification for this trend seems to be 
that it increases human freedom, while the value in question 
historically seems to be of only peripheral Importance given 
the larger socialist character of the movement. The unspo­
ken question seems to be: how important can this particular 
issue be if the practice has always existed, to some degree, 
within the movement and in no way does it undermine the 
fundamental economic relations of the collective?
This practice varies among the three major kibbutz 
federations. Ihud is more inclined toward experimentation 
and change than either the Meuhad or Artzi federations and 
has, in fact, been more receptive to having children sleep 
with parents. However, in looking at the concessions al­
ready made by each of the federations to demands for more 
individualism, it is quite likely that this particular 
trend will gain momentum in the years to come.
Some of the changes in the kibbutz way of life re­
flect the fact that the kibbutz Is a socialist movement 
existing in a larger capitalist society,. The kibbutz com­
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mitment to economic progress has socio-historical roots,, to 
be sure, but It also reflects the fact that the kibbutz has 
to compete economically to remain a viable concern. This 
explains one of the reasons why the kibbutz abandoned the 
idea of farming as a way of life.
Because the kibbutz movement represents only about 
3 per cent of the total Israeli population and there is a 
chronic labor shortage, it is sensitive to the need to 
recruit new members and meet the individual needs of existing 
members. It is difficult to do this if the larger Israeli 
society offers a much more modern lifestyle. Thus, the 
trend toward individuation in consumption can be viewed as 
an attempt to make kibbutz life more attractive. Again, 
this suggests that living in a kibbutz today is more and 
more of a practical consideration, rather than the moral and 
emotional commitment found in the early days.
A number of historical events have also taken place 
with direct effects upon how the kibbutznik views the group 
and his relation to it. Before the establishment of the 
State in 19^8 the kibbutz was the primary instrument of 
Zionism in Palestine. After the creation of the State much 
of the prestige and influence of the kibbutz was absorbed 
by the Jewish government. Suddenly, the kibbutz was no 
longer the priority, the existence of the State was more 
important. Many of the activities of the kibbutz were taken 
over by the government, and many kibbutz leaders (including 
Moshe Dyan, levi Eshkol, David Ben-Gurion, and Golda Meir)
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were drawn into national rather than kibbutz service. From 
19^ +8 to 1967 the role of the kibbutz movement in the affairs 
of the State steadily declined in the eyes of the general 
public. It was during this period that the kibbutz Indus­
trialized and begah to provide for increased individual 
freedom in an attempt to curb attrition.
As a result of the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yorn 
Kippur War (1973) ? "the kibbutz enjoyed a rebirth of sorts. 
Lining the frontier, the kibbutzim were invaluable in the 
defense of the country. For example, in the Six-Day War 
kibbutzniks incurred over 25 per cent of the casualties, 
yet represented only 3 per cent of the population. Kibbutz­
niks also proved to be the best fighter pilots In the 
Israeli Air Force. This reaffirmed to members of the move­
ment and to the Israeli nation as a whole that the kibbutz 
still plays a central role in the realization of a Jewish 
National Homeland. It is interesting to note that those 
kibbutzim in the most dangerous areas never want for volun­
teers, while those in more secure areas often experience 
attrition.
I believe that a very important element in communal 
life is the degree to which kibbutzniks view the kibbutz as 
the pioneering movement it certainly was before 19^8, and 
the degree to which the Israeli people do also. There have 
been tv/o periods of prestige for the kibbutz--before 19^8 
and since 1967--also periods of group cohesion and deep 
feelings of community. With the revival of the pioneering
102.
spirit has come the recognition that the integrity of the 
movement may indeed rest on how well the kibbutz is able to 
support the national government's attempts to secure its 
survival, rather than how effectively the kibbutz is able to 
defend certain value positions. This is an important aspect 
of the kibbutz ideological mentality.
If the spirit of "kibbutzness" is changing, what is 
it changing from and what is it changing into, sociologically 
speaking?
THE CHANGING FACE OF COMMUNALITY
One way to characterize this trend is as a change 
from the primary group relations of the early days. The 
conception of "primary groups" originated in the mind of 
Charles Horton Cooley. Although he did not specifically use 
the term "secondary groups," he implied that they were 
groups with characteristics opposite to primary groups.
Type examples of the primary group are the 
family, or household group, the old-fashioned neigh­
borhood, and the spontaneous play-group of children. 
In such groups all children everywhere participate, 
and the intimate association there realized works 
upon them everywhere in much the same way. It tends 
to develop sympathetic insight into the moods and 
states of mind of other people and this in turn 
underlies the development of both the flexible type 
of behavior and the common attitudes and sentiments 
which we have mentioned....
The chief characteristics of a primary group are:
1) Face-to-face association.
2) Unspecialized character of that association.
3) Relative permanence.
4) Small number of persons involved.
5) Relative intimacy among the participants.
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Such groups are primary in several senses, 
but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming 
the social nature and ideals of the individual. The 
result of intimate association, psychologically, is 
a certain fusion of individualities in a common 
whole, so that one’s very self, for many purposes at 
least, is the common life and purpose of the group. 
Perhaps the simplest way of describing this whole­
ness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the 
sort of sympathy and mutual identification for 
which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in 
the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of 
his will in that feeling (Cooley, Angell, and Carr; 
1933*55-56).
Another way to characterize this trend is as a change 
from community to society. Ferdinand Tonnies saw a clear 
and irreversible trend from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, 
in which primitive, traditional, closely knit communities 
are torn and uprooted, to be replaced by a large, urbanized,
industrialized society in which human relations are imper­
sonal and instrumental.
The key concepts in Tonnies* system are ideal types 
which are based on the individual will that underlies the 
concrete social relationships. Tonnies characterized the 
Gemeinschaft in terms of natural will and the Gesellschaft 
in terms of rational will. In the case of rational will, 
relationships are established because they are mutually 
beneficial to the interactants. Means and ends have been 
sharply differentiated, as in Weber’s Zwe ckrationalem. On 
the other hand, people may enter into relationships because
they are valued in and of themselves. In this case natural
will predominates.
The concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are
10 .^
used to differentiate social entities, or soziale Wesenheiten. 
These are classified as social relationships, collectives, 
and social organizations or corporations.
Tonnies also described three types of norms s (1) 
order, (2) law, and (3) morality. Those norms which relate 
to order are the most fundamental to daily life. The more 
complicated social life becomes, the more complicated are 
the mechanisms needed to insure basic order. For example, 
traffic regulations are a necessary creation of modern 
society. In a Gemeinschaft, the norms relating to order are 
based on concord, or Eintracht. In a Gesellschaft, they 
are based on convention.
It is important to note that these concepts are 
mental constructs which are not empirically extant. Also, 
one type does not exist to the exclusion of the other. In 
the kibbutz we can talk of a general drift from gemein- 
schaftliche to gesellschaftliche social forms, but this does 
not mean that elements of a Gemeinschaft will not persist.
The most important elements in this change can be found in 
the system of collective consumption, in the institution of 
collective education and child rearing, and in the pioneering 
spirit of the movement. However, the system of mutual 
responsibility is an excellent example of a gemeinschaftliche 
social form that has endured the years of social change.
CHAPTER VII
PROGRESS AND COMMONALITYs 
CRISIS IN THE KIBBUTZ
Three major hypotheses were herein explored con­
cerning the development of the kibbutz movement.
#
First, ideology impacts upon itself and upon social 
structure and, in turn, is impacted upon by social structure. 
"Ideologies are always peculiarly vulnerable and open to 
criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure 
to reckon with experienced facts" (Cornforth; 1972:72). The 
kibbutz movement has been particularly guilty of self- 
contradiction in value positions.
This system is not, as it often seems, some 
well-integrated and unchanging system of basic con­
cepts towards which the members of the community 
are oriented and which they tended to follow more 
conscientiously in the past than in the present. 
Contrary to this popular opinion, the ideology of 
the kibbutz is a heterogeneous system composed of 
elements stemming from Socialism, Zionism, humanistic 
ethics and sometimes religion, which are integrated 
only in a most strenuous way; as a result, the sys­
tem contains many potential internal contradictions 
which, under certain circumstances, create dilemmas 
of decision and action for the members (Cohen;
1966:4).
As a result, Cohen concluded that some of the changes taking 
place in the kibbutz can be understood "not as results of
105.
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external pressures upon the value system, hut as rearrange­
ments within the value system itself forced upon it hy its 
■inner logic, its Eigenge se tz1i chkeitu (1966:4).
The preoccupation in the early days with farming as 
a way of life, asceticism, simplicity, and physical labor 
was, in part, the result of deep-seated feelings the early 
kibbutzniks had about the physical and spiritual aspects of 
traditional Jewishness. The kibbutz movement is an attempt 
at personal and national regeneration, the affirmation of 
a new Jewish ethic.
Relative to the last point, the abandonment of 
farming as a way of life, the consequent industrialization 
of the kibbutz movement, and the use of hired labor all 
impacted upon the development of kibbutz ideology.
The second major hypothesis is that in the course of 
ideological development, the original values have been con­
tinuously reinterpreted so as to preserve the integrity of 
the kibbutzim as a unique and highly successful socialist 
movement which has remained true to its ideals. This whole 
process may be called ideological elaboration (Cornforth: 
1972), in which (a) some values have been abandoned alto­
gether; (b) some values have been modified; and (c) other 
values have been maintained. Specifically, maintained 
values have been determined to be essential to the kibbutz 
way of life, to be ends in themselves, while modified or 
abandoned values have been determined to be of marginal 
importance to the kibbutz way of life, and were conceived as
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means to achieve desired ends.
Third, the individual kibbutzim were always dedi­
cated to economic progress--progress both of the movement 
itself and of the Jewish people as a nation--and herein lies 
the crisis in the kibbutz and, specifically, the problem 
facing ideological elaboration. On the one hand, the kib­
butz is committed to modernity in its technological and 
economic organization and, on the other hand, to primitivity 
in its social relations. The problem facing the kibbutz is 
simply that it has embraced two fundamentally contradictory 
value positions, progress and communality, and yet its sur­
vival and integrity depend to a great extent on how success­
fully it maintains the commitment to each. The whole process 
of ideological elaboration is an attempt to render compatible 
these divergent trends.
The point is, that under the economic conditions of 
progress, the kibbutz cannot maintain the commitment to 
communality in precisely the same way it did in the early 
days. We know from Durkheim that the trend from mechanical 
to organic solidarity is predicated on certain economic 
factors that relate directly to societal growth and develop­
ment. This is not to suggest that the kibbutz is not com­
mitted to the ideal of communality, but simply that the 
institutional arrangements that constitute the ideal in 
practice have evolved as the kibbutz itself has evolved.
In the early days, the feeling of community was one 
of intensely emotional commitment to the activities of the
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group which, in turn, embodied a quasi-religious ideal. As 
the founding fathers grew older, the second and third gen­
eration took their places of leadership, and the revolution­
ary movement itself became institutionalized. One of the 
most difficult things for any revolutionary group is to 
inculcate in their children, the second generation revolu­
tionaries, the ideas and ideals of the parents. The 
emotional commitment of the founders cannot be passed on 
very easily since the children are one generation removed 
from the direct experience. The result of all this has been 
that an air of pragmatism has been ushered into the kibbutz 
with the second and third generation. Those things which 
tie individual to individual and individual to community, 
or in other words promote a feeling of communality, are more 
and more the objective aspects of the system, i.e., mutual 
responsibility. The sturm und drang is gone.
There is an important exception to this however. 
Since the Six-Day War in 19^7 > there has been a rebirth of 
spirit in the kibbutz. Once again (and not since the estab­
lishment of the State in 1948) kibbutzniks feel proud of 
their role in the preservation of the State, of the dream. 
This has greatly contributed to a feeling of community In 
the kibbutz.
Throughout its history the kibbutz has remained 
committed to progress. That which constitutes progress has 
always been defined by kibbutzniks as encompassing growth, 
innovation, efficiency, and productivity. However, that
which constitutes communal life has indeed changed, and this 
change has been justified through the process of ideological 
elaborati on.
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